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Abstract
On June 29, 1972, the United States Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia,1 vacating the death sentences
imposed upon capital defendants in Georgia and Texas.
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INTRODUCTION

On June 29, 1972, the United States Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia,1 vacating the death sentences
imposed upon capital defendants in Georgia and Texas. The decision
effectively invalidated all state death penalty statutes then in existence,
thereby preventing the execution of over 600 inmates incarcerated on
various death rows. Though the Court left open the possibility that
more narrowly drafted capital sentencing statutes might survive judi* J.D., Yale University School of Law, 1988; M.Phil., Yale University, 1991;
M.A., Yale University, 1987; A.B., Princeton University, 1979. Former law clerk for
United States Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, 1989-90.
The author would like to thank the following people for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article: Vikram Amar, John Blum, Robert Burt, Evan Caminker,
and Jordan Steiker.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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cial scrutiny, many observers doubted that states would in fact choose
to enact new laws. 2 Within the next six months, however, the Florida
legislature passed, and the state's governor signed, a bill authorizing
the imposition of the death penalty. By 1976, when the Supreme Court
next examined the constitutionality of capital punishment, a total of
thirty-five states had enacted capital sentencing statutes designed to
comply with the ruling in Furman.3 This article examines the process
by which the Florida statute was enacted in 1972.
Although two members of the Furman Court argued that capital
punishment was per se unconstitutional, the other three Justices of the
majority stated only that the capital sentencing procedures then in
place were constitutionally defective. The ensuing debate in Florida
centered on the effort to devise a procedural scheme that would survive
judicial scrutiny. That debate furnished an enlightening case study of
constitutional decision-making by elected representatives. For the most
part, the legislature was astute and conscientious in its efforts to parse
the nine separate opinions issued by the Supreme Court in Furman.
The evidence indicates, however, that legislators were motivated by
pragmatic concerns rather than by any sense of obligation to abide by
the Supreme Court's instructions. A bill that would be upheld (and
thus could be enforced) was preferable to one that would be struck
down; but any bill was preferable to no bill at all.
At the time Furman was decided, the case was widely regarded as
brazenly undemocratic In an abrupt and hazily reasoned fashion, it was
said, the Court had brought an end to a form of punishment utilized in
a large majority of the country. Justice Powell, in dissent, argued that,
[i]t is important to keep in focus the enormity of the step undertaken by the Court today. Not only does it invalidate hundreds of
state and federal laws, it deprives those jurisdictions of the power
to legislate with respect to capital punishment in the future, except
in a manner consistent with the cloudily outlined views of those
Justices who do not purport to undertake total abolition. Nothing
short of an amendment to the United States Constitution can reverse the Court's judgments. Meanwhile, all flexibility is fore-

2. For example, NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorney Jack Greenberg asserted
that "[t]here will no longer be any more capital punishment in the United States."
MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 291 (1986).

3. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 & n.23 (1976) (Stewart, Powell
& Stevens, JJ.) (listing statutes).
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closed. The normal democratic process . . . is now shut off."
In retrospect, however, it is clear that Furman stimulated rather than
aborted the national debate over the death penalty. In an important
sense the decision was not at all undemocratic. The Court ensured that
capital sentencing schemes would not remain in operation simply because of inertial forces within the legislature. Rather, imposition of the
death penalty would be allowed to continue only if it could be demonstrated that contemporaneous support for capital punishment remained
strong. Furman did not simply command that the states adopt new capital sentencing procedures-it invited the states to decide anew whether
they wished to have capital punishment at all.
Did Furman induce the Florida legislature to undertake a true reevaluation of the propriety of capital punishment? The record is mixed.
Certainly the decision brought an end to the legislature's prior unwillingness to discuss the issue. The burden of going forward was shifted to
proponents of the death penalty, and abolition was conceded to be an
option genuinely open for consideration. Had opponents of the death
penalty been numerous within the legislature, it is quite possible that a
thorough re-examination of the subject would have ensued. In the end,
however, support for capital punishment was so overwhelming that the
inquiry was a cursory one. Although Furman ensured that Florida
would not retain the death penalty simply through legislative inertia, it
did not induce the legislature to put aside its preconceptions and start
from scratch.

II.
A.

HISTORY

Furman v. Georgia

The vote in Furman was 5-4; the five Justices in the majority issued five separate opinions, and no Justice in the majority joined the
opinion of any other. Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that
capital punishment was per se violative of the Eighth Amendment ban
on "cruel and unusual punishments." Justices Douglas, Stewart, and
White did not go so far. Their opinions were not models of clarity, and
there were differences of emphasis among them; all three Justices, however, appeared to share the view that the Texas and Georgia statutes
were unconstitutional because they conferred upon juries unlimited dis-

4.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 461-62 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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cretion to decide which defendants would live and which would die.
Justices Stewart and White placed particular emphasis on the rarity
with which capital sentences were actually imposed. Justice Stewart asserted that "[t]hese death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual . . . . [T]he
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed."' 5 Justice White
argued that "the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even
for the most atrocious crimes . . . . [T]here is no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the 'few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases
6
in which it is not.
Lurking at the edges of the debate was the question of race. Justice White's opinion did not allude to the issue of racial discrimination,
and Justice Stewart mentioned it only obliquely.7 But, as the concurring opinions of Justices Douglas8 and Marshall9 made clear, capital
punishment during the previous half-century had been disproportionately imposed upon blacks. That history of discrimination formed the
centerpiece of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's constitutional challenge to the death penalty. 10 The evil of discretionary capital sentencing, then, was not simply that it could lead to "random" or "arbitrary"
results. The absence of any check on the jury's discretion also increased
the danger that the death penalty would be applied in a racially discriminatory fashion. The attempt to develop improved capital sentencing schemes was, in an important sense, an effort to devise procedures

5. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced
to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race. But racial discrimination
has not been proved, and I put it to one side.") (citations omitted).
8. Id. at 249-51 (Douglas, J., concurring).
9. Justice Marshall noted that,
[a] total of 3859 persons have been executed since 1930, of whom 1751
were white and 2066 were Negro. Of the executions, 3334 were for murder; 1664 of the executed murderers were white and 1630 were Negro; 455
persons, including 48 whites and 405 Negroes, were executed for rape. It is
immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than
whites in proportion to their percentage of the population.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
10. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment
Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL. REV. 158, 164-70
(1985).
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that would reduce the likelihood that race could influence the choice
1
between life and death.'
Several Justices, both in the majority and among the dissenters,
emphasized that the constitutionality of certain types of capital sentencing laws remained an open question. Justice White noted that
"[t]he facial constitutionality of statutes requiring the imposition of the
death penalty for first-degree murder, for more narrowly defined categories of murder, or for rape would present quite different issues under
the Eighth Amendment than are posed by the cases before us.""2 Justice Stewart also reserved judgment as to the constitutionality of laws
mandating a death sentence for particular crimes, 13 and Justice Powell
observed that the legality of such statutes "remains undecided."'"
Mandatory sentencing was not identified as the only method by
which states might seek to draft new death penalty laws. Chief Justice
Burger suggested that "legislative bodies may seek to bring their laws
into compliance with the Court's ruling by providing standards for juries and judges to follow in determining the sentence in capital cases or
by more narrowly defining the crimes for which the penalty may be
imposed." 15 In the main, however, contemporary observers concluded
that mandatory statutes would enjoy the greatest chance of Supreme
Court approval. The concerns expressed by Justices Stewart and
White--that vesting absolute discretion in the sentencing jury had led
to unjustified variations in the treatment of similarly-situated defendants, and that the infrequency with which capital punishment had been
imposed rendered it useless as a method of deterrence-seemed to
many to be best addressed by a sentencing statute that gave the jury no
discretion at the sentencing stage and provided that all defendants convicted of enumerated crimes would receive the death penalty.
There was a certain irony to the suggestion that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" might require that any capital sentencing statute be mandatory. As the Court
had noted only a year prior to Furman, mandatory capital sentencing
statutes had, in the distant past, been the norm within the United

11. Controversy over the racially disproportionate impact of the death penalty
has not yet abated. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
12. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310.
13. Id. at 307 (Stewart, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 417 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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States.'" Such statutes had been universally repudiated, however. If juries conscientiously followed their oaths, these laws led to unduly harsh
results in cases which fell within the statutory definition of a capital
crime but which, due to mitigating factors, seemed not to merit a death
sentence. Moreover, juries were frequently tempted to disregard their
oaths and acquit the defendant of a capital offense if they regarded him
as undeserving of the death penalty.
It was to address these problems that discretionary sentencing
schemes were enacted. Legislatures "adopted the method of forthrightly granting juries the discretion which they had been exercising in
fact."1 7 Indeed, the principal thrust of the Furman dissenters' attack
lay in their contention that the states might respond to the Court's decision by enacting mandatory capital sentencing statutes, and that such
laws would be far more cruel and oppressive than the discretionary
schemes struck down in Furman. Chief Justice Burger commented that
"[i]f [mandatory sentencing] is the only alternative that the legislatures can safely pursue under today's ruling, I would have preferred
that the Court opt for total abolition." 8 Justice Blackmun agreed:
"This approach, it seems to me, encourages legislation that is regressive
and of an antique mold, for it eliminates the element of mercy in the
imposition of punishment. I thought we had passed beyond that point
in our criminology long ago.'' 19
B.

The Florida Response

Within the State of Florida, editorial reaction to Furman was
mixed. The St. Petersburg Times expressed strong support for the
decision:
The American civilization reached a new height of respect for
human life this week when the U.S. Supreme Court declared the
death penalty unconstitutional . . . .Now that the high court has
spoken, it is doubtful that the penalty will be revived, despite Chief
Justice Warren Burger's attempt to make a place for it.2"
The Miami Herald concluded: "Our own view is that capital punish16.

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198-201 (1971).

17.

Id. at 199.

18.
19.
20.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
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ment can be (and has been) performed in irreconcilable error and that
it is repugnant to take human life in the name of society." 2 1 The
Tampa Tribune, by contrast, excoriated the ruling:
The five Justices [in the majority] let their personal feelings or the
emotions aroused by the cases of three members of a minority race
lead them astray from a constitutional course . .

.

.The states'

Constitutional right to impose [capital punishment] ought to be restored-but it will be restored, we think, only by another Nixon
22
appointment to the Supreme Court.

The Tallahassee Democrat stated that "[tihe majority opinions give
some indication of how far some justices have strayed from the nation's
Constitution.12 3 The paper also decried the ambiguity of the decision:

If the Congress or any State legislature should ever pass such a
jumble of separate views and present them as law to be followed by
the people, the Supreme Court itself would immediately and very
properly rule it out as too vague and arbitrary for a citizen to un24
derstand and obey.
The Florida Times-Union asserted:
Now, along comes the U.S. Supreme Court with a masterpiece of
legal obfuscation which at least severely limits-and perhaps eliminates-use of capital punishment as a deterrent against capital
crimes such as murder, kidnapping, and rape. The court has steadily been pulling the teeth of society so that its remaining response
capability toward crime is so weak as to be almost laughable to the
predatory criminal . .

.

.[I]n the dire straits in which the United

21. An End to Death Penalties, More or Less, and Unless .
MIAMI HERALD,
June 30, 1972, at 6A.
22. What Punishment is Usual and Uncruel?, TAMPA TRIBUNE, June 30, 1972,
at 20A. A subsequent Tribune letter to the editor was less sanguine about the prospects
for the Court should George McGovern be elected President: "The first vacancy would
possibly be filled by a female Chicano under age 30, the next by a Yippie earning less
than a thousand dollars a year who believed water should be used only for human
consumption, the next by an impoverished octogenarian, etc." John F. King, Majority
Rule Aborted, TAMPA TRIBUNE, July 2, 1972, at 2C.
23. Supreme Court Adds Fuel to National Controversy, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, July 1, 1972, at 4.
24. Malcolm B. Johnson, Death Penalty Decision Shows Prime U.S. Conflict,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, July 2, 1972, at 2B.
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States now finds itself in the battle against crime-to remove its
most formidable weapon is cruel and unusual punishment for
thousands upon thousands of citizens who will be murdered because the court has held their lives so cheap. 5
Florida newspapers' initial reactions to Furman (whether pro or
con) were generally emphatic and unequivocal. By contrast, Governor
Reubin Askew's response was cautious and noncommittal:
I'm pleased that the Supreme Court has made a decision on the
very difficult question of capital punishment. Apparently, however,
the decision is limited in its application and we'll have to carefully
review the actual court opinions before we can determine the effect
upon those who are now under the death penalty in Florida."
A supporter of capital punishment during his tenure as a state legislator, Askew had become ambivalent about the death penalty. In 1971,
he had called upon the legislature to establish a moratorium on executions within the state, and to authorize the appointment of a commission to study the issue. The legislature had rejected both requests. In
February 1972 Askew had issued an Executive Order staying all executions in Florida until July 1, 1973;2" he again appealed to the legislature for the establishment of a study commission, a request that was
again denied.
The Supreme Court in Furman had not expressly considered the
constitutionality of the Florida capital sentencing law. Its holding was
limited to the Georgia and Texas statutes. The Florida statute then in
effect, however, gave the jury absolute discretion to grant or withhold
mercy in a capital case, and therefore clearly fell within the Furman
rationale. 8 The state conceded that the statute was invalid under
Furman. The law was quickly declared unconstitutional by the Florida

25.
26.

FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, June 30, 1972, at A6.
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 30, 1972, at 8A.

27. Executive Order No. 72-8 (1972). The stay order had no immediate effect; a
stay order issued in 1967 by a federal district judge already prevented Florida from
executing any of its death row inmates. See Adderly v. Wainwright, 272 F. Supp. 530
(M.D. Fla. 1967). No one was executed in Florida during Askew's eight years as governor, either prior to Furman or after passage of the new statute.
28. Florida law in effect at the time of Furman provided that "[a] person who
has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death unless the verdict
includes a recommendation to mercy by a majority of the jury, in which case the punishment shall be life imprisonment." FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1971).
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Supreme Court in Donaldson v. Sack,29 and by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Newman v. Wainwright.0
The state's death row inmates were resentenced to terms of imprisonment pursuant to orders issued in Anderson v. State 1 and In re
Baker."' A Florida law passed in March 1972, with an effective date of
October 1, 1972, provided that if the state's death penalty law were
declared unconstitutional, all inmates under sentence of death would be
resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.3 3
Since all the state's death row prisoners were resentenced prior to that
law's effective date, however, all remained eligible for parole.
Although Furman clearly invalidated the Florida statutory scheme
in effect on June 29, 1972, that scheme had in any event already been
amended by the Florida legislature. A bill passed in March 1972, with
an effective date of October 1, 1972, had established a new procedure
for capital sentencing.3 4 The statute listed eight aggravating and eight
mitigating circumstances. 3 5 The law also provided for a bifurcated
trial: if a defendant was convicted of a capital offense, a separate sentencing hearing would follow, at which both the defendant and the
state could present "evidence of the circumstances surrounding the
crime, of the defendant's background and history and any facts in aggravation or mitigation including but not limited to those circumstances enumerated in" the statute.36 The defendant would continue to
be sentenced to death unless a majority of the jury recommended
mercy. The new law provided some degree of guidance to the penalty
jurors, though the jury remained free to base its decision on factors not
enumerated in the statute. For the moment, at least, it was unclear
whether the new statute sufficiently constrained the jury's discretion to
withstand a constitutional challenge.
The first significant step toward enactment of a new death penalty
statute occurred on July 7, 1972. At a press conference in Starke, Florida, Attorney General Robert Shevin recommended passage of a new

29. 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972).
30. 464 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1972).
31. 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972).
32. 267 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1972).
33. 1972 Fla. Laws 118.
34. 1972 Fla. Laws 72.
35. The aggravating and mitigating circumstances were taken from the capital
sentencing statute included in the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
36. 1972 Fla. Laws 72.
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capital punishment law.3 7 Shevin expressed the view that "in all likelihood neither Mr. Justice Stewart nor Mr. Justice White would find a
statute calling for the mandatory imposition of death under certain
enumerated circumstances offensive to the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution" and that a statute mandating a capital
sentence for specified crimes was therefore likely to withstand Supreme
Court review. 3 8 Shevin argued that only a mandatory statute could be
upheld and that the Florida law scheduled to take effect in October was
therefore a nullity:
The purpose this statute was designed to serve was to permit additional evidence to go before the jury so it could make a more intelligent disposition of its discretionary power to grant or withhold
mercy. This was condemned by the Court in Furman v. [Georgia],
and as a consequence can no longer form any facet of a determination in a capital case. 9
Shevin recommended passage of a bill mandating a capital sentence for
anyone convicted of a premeditated killing "[o]f any law enforcement
officer;" "[o]f any penal institution officer;" "[p]ursuant to a contract
for profit;" "[c]ommitted or perpetrated during the commission of any
felony directed against another person;" "[b]y an assassin or person
taking the life of any state or federal official;" "[c]ommitted by a parolee or probationer previously convicted of first degree murder;" "[o]f
a person in connection with the hijacking of an airplane, bus, train,
ship or other commercial vehicle.'
Shevin further recommended that
Governor Askew call a special session of the legislature, either immediately or after the November elections. Passage of a new capital sentencing bill during the April 1973 legislative session would be inadequate, he argued, because "[a]ny extended delay in remedial legislation
. . . may unfortunately result in the loss of lives between the present
37. The Florida Attorney General is an independently elected official who typically exercises considerable autonomy. During the fall of 1972, Shevin also proposed
enactment of a sweeping new human rights statute and a strong reporters' shield law.

ST.

PETERSBURG TIMEs,

Nov. 10, 1972, at B3; ST.

PETERSBURG TIMES,

Nov. 5, 1972, at

BI. Shevin served as Attorney General until 1978, when he sought the Democratic
nomination for Governor. He won a plurality in the opening primary but was defeated
in the runoff by Bob Graham who subsequently won the general election.
38. Memorandum from Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida 6 (July 7,
1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 19, Carton 464).
39. Id. at 9.
40. Id. at 14.
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day and the regular session of the Legislature."'
On July 10 Governor Askew announced that he would not call an

immediate special session of the legislature but would convene a special
session after the November elections. In the meantime, he stated, he
would appoint a commission to study both the desirability of capital

punishment generally and the specific form that any death penalty statute might take. An immediate session could nevertheless have been
called by agreement of the Senate President and House Speaker, or by

a three-fifths vote within each chamber.' Senate President Jerry
Thomas (D-Jupiter) pushed for an immediate session, arguing that
"the general public is entitled to optimum protection."' 3 House
Speaker Richard Pettigrew (D-Miami) demurred, however, arguing

that "[t]his complex and vitally significant decision of sentencing one
of our citizens to death deserves dispassionate and deliberative legislative study unfettered by the hectic and emotional demands of campaign

time."' Senator Thomas' attempt to secure the necessary votes within
the legislature received negligible support, eliminating the possibility of

an immediate special session.'5
During the late summer and early fall, several ad hoc committees
were formed within the state to study the issue of capital punishment.
On July 19 Representative Pettigrew appointed a House Select Committee, chaired by Representative Jeff Gautier (D-Miami) and com-

Id. at 13.
42. Terrell Sessums, who succeeded Richard Pettigrew as Speaker of the House,
recalls 'that,
[i]n 1968 when we revised the Constitution we were so offended by Governor Kirk's tendency to call special sessions out of the clear blue sky that
we-I don't know that we really put any restrictions on the governor's
ability to call a special session, but we put in a proviso that the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House could jointly call a special
session. And we used that to suggest to the governor that if he was too
imperial in calling special sessions without prior legislative consultations,
we were going to call special sessions as soon as he left on vacation, or on a
trade mission to Europe, or something like that . ...
Interview with Terrell Sessums in Tampa, Fla. (Dec. 17, 1990).
43. William Mansfield, Shevin Asks Executions to be Restored, MIAMI HERALD,
July 8, 1972, at IA, 20A.
44. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 20, 1972, at lB.
45. Senator Thomas did not seek re-election in 1972; an immediate special session would thus have afforded him his only opportunity to participate directly in the
enactment of a new death penalty statute. Senator Thomas switched to the Republican
Party in December 1972 and ran unsuccessfully for Governor in 1974.
41.
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posed entirely of members of the Florida House. That committee's second session revealed confusion as to the nature of the group's
assignment. When Tobias Simon, a Miami attorney appearing as a witness before the committee, commenced a broad, slashing attack on the
death penalty, Gautier interrupted him:
Let me say, Mr. Simon, before I call for any questions from the
committee members, that our committee was not charged with
whether or not to reinstate the death penalty. That is the subject of
another committee's deliberations. The Governor of the State of
Florida, Reubin Askew, has appointed a committee to do just that.
To recommend to the legislature whether or not the death penalty
should be reinstated . ..I would suggest that if [the governor's
committee] has a separate hearing that you should appear also, because his committee really is making the basic determination that
you are alluding to today."'
Gautier's apparent impression that the committee's sole task was to
draft suitable legislation was soon corrected. A few minutes later Gautier announced: "I received a note from the Speaker that he did not
mean to limit the scope of this Committee's work and if, at the conclusion, the Committee feels that an alternative to the death penalty can
be imposed, that we're certainly not restricted from recommending
it.",47
Even after this clarification, however, the focus of the Committee's
inquiry was remarkably narrow. On August 18 the committee interviewed former death row inmates at the state penitentiary. One inmate
characterized the judicial system in the panhandle as a "kangaroo
court" and asserted that lies had been told throughout his trial. The
possibility that an innocent man would be condemned to death (and,
more generally, the fairness of capital trials in Florida) would seem
highly relevant to the propriety of reinstating the death penalty-though a single inmate's unsupported claim of innocence might
be of small probative value. Chairman Gautier, however, admonished
the witness to confine his remarks to the topics before the committee:
1) whether the death penalty should be revived, 2) whether capital
punishment deters, and 3) whether life imprisonment without parole

46.

Hearings of the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty 29 (Aug. 9,

1972) (unofficial transcript on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series
19, Carton 464) (hereinafter House Hearings-transcript).
47. Id. at 44.
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would be an adequate alternative."8 Committee members thereafter
contented themselves with asking inmates what punishment would be
appropriate if one of their best friends were murdered, or whether they
would be "deterred" from resistance if they were robbed at gunpoint.
At the beginning of its fifth session on August 31, the committee
voted 5-1 that the death penalty should be reinstated. 9 At no time did
the committee discuss or debate the propriety of capital punishment.
Gautier then admonished the witnesses that from this time forward
their comments should be limited to the merits of particular bills.50
In accordance with Shevin's recommendation, the bill developed
by the House Committee attempted to eliminate jury discretion by
mandating a sentence of death upon conviction. There were, however,
significant differences between the Attorney General's bill and the bill
ultimately drafted by the committee. The Shevin bill mandated the
death penalty only for certain categories of premeditated murder. As
Assistant Attorney General Ray Marky explained, this limitation was
seen as essential, since history had shown that a statute mandating
death for all premeditated murders would lead to widespread jury
nullification:
Jury nullification came about when the death penalty was geared
toward homicides generally . . . . The fact that juries engaged in
jury nullification when we were talking about all types of homicides
does not mean that we are going to have jury nullification in specification [sic] types of crimes of a very aggravated nature.5 1
Shevin expressed uncertainty about the constitutionality of a bill requiring the death penalty for all first-degree murders:
By saying that all premeditated murders are mandatory death penalty you're getting into the areas where juries have traditionally
been willing to grant mercy . . . . You may be running headlong
into another constitutional problem at the U.S. Supreme Court
level and. . . you may be, in this instance, providing a punishment
48.

Hearings of the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty (Aug. 18,

1972) (tape on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) (hereinafter House
Hearings-tape).
49. The only member of the committee to vote against reinstatement of the death
penalty was Representative Gwendolyn Cherry (D-Miami), a longtime foe of capital
punishment.
50. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Aug. 31, 1972).
51. House Hearings-transcript, supra note 46, at 19 (Aug. 4, 1972).
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that perhaps is a little bit too harsh.52

The committee, however, was unreceptive to the limitations established
by the Shevin bill; committee members argued both that the criminal's
punishment should not depend on the status of the victim and that the
bill would create disruptive line-drawing problems. Ultimately the com-

mittee recommended passage of a bill mandating a sentence of death
for five classes of crimes: premeditated murder, felony murder, treason,
"[t]hrowing a destructive device which results in the death of a per53
son;" and "[r]ape of a person under the age of thirteen.1
Other ad hoc committees meeting during the late summer and fall
also recommended that the death penalty be reinstated. The Senate
Council on Criminal Justice, appointed by outgoing Senate President
Jerry Thomas, with Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice B.K. Roberts
acting as honorary chairman, voted 12-2 to recommend a law making

the death penalty mandatory for specified categories of murder and for
the rape of a child under eleven. 5' Chief Justice Roberts asserted that

"[t]here has been no capital punishment for six years and we are living
in the greatest crime wave in the history of the world."' 55 The presence

52. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Aug. 31, 1972).
53.

Final report of the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty 5 (Nov.

27, 1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 19, Carton
464).
The bill drafted by the committee did contain a definition of "premeditation" narrower than that which had prevailed under prior Florida law. The bill provided that,
[a] premeditated design to kill is a fully formed conscious and deliberate
purpose to take human life, formed upon reflection and deliberation and
present in the mind at the time of the killing and which was not primarily
induced by great and unjustified provocation on the part of the intended
victim, nor was committed under a sudden heat of passion or other such
condition which precludes the idea of reflection and deliberation.
Fla. HB I-A § 2 (Spec. Sess. 1972). That definition was intended to ensure that killings committed during barroom brawls or lovers' quarrels would not be capital offenses,
despite the fact that they were considered premeditated murders under prior Florida
law.
54. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, October 31, 1972, at lB.
55. Chief Justice Roberts did not place all the blame on the absence of capital
punishment. In the fall of 1972, the Florida Supreme Court briefly rescinded, then
reinstated, the state rule requiring unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases. Roberts
dissented from the order reinstating the rule, arguing that "[w]e cannot escape the fact
that numerous mistrials are a contributing factor to the greatest crime wave ever existing in this country." Unanimity Stays in Jury Verdicts, MIAMI

HERALD,

Dec. 7,

1972, at 2B (Street Edition).
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of a sitting state supreme court justice on such a committee raised the
obvious specter of a conflict of interest should a death penalty bill be
passed and its constitutionality challenged. Chief Justice Roberts defended his participation on the ground that "I make recommendations
to Legislative committees all the time as chairman of the Florida Judicial Council." 5 6 However, Roberts ultimately recused himself in State
v. Dixon,5 7 the case in which the Florida Supreme Court first passed
upon the constitutionality of the state's new death penalty statute. The
Florida Judicial Council (chaired by Roberts) also recommended reinstatement of capital punishment,5" as did the Board of Directors of the
59
Florida State Chamber of Commerce.
The most far-reaching inquiry into the issue was conducted by the
study committee appointed by Governor Askew. Chaired by E. Harris
Drew, a former Florida Supreme Court Justice, the seventeen-member
committee included two former governors of the state, three state Senators and three state Representatives, as well as eminent members of the
bench, bar, and public. The committee was provided with a staff and
was assisted by an advisory committee and a legal advisory committee.6 0 The group held hearings throughout the state, taking testimony
from the public, former death row inmates, police and correctional officials, and experts in the field of criminal justice. Governor Askew
pledged to withhold judgment on the issue pending the preparation of
the committee's report.
On October 20, the committee voted 9-6 to recommend reinstatement of the death penalty. Former Governor LeRoy Collins delivered

56.

Tom Raum, Six Are Winners With 'Walking' Races, TALLAHASSEE DEMO-

CRAT, Nov. 15, 1972, at 2.

57. 283 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
58. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 5, 1972, at lB.
59. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 15, 1972, at 4B.
60. The legal advisory committee was composed of five professors from Florida
law schools. Its report concluded that "no constitutional basis can justify any attempt
to reinstate capital punishment without an accompanying fundamental change in our
system of criminal justice." Final Report of the Governor's Committee To Study Capital Punishment 114 (Nov. 21, 1972) (hereinafter Governor's Committee Report). A
slightly revised version of the legal advisory committee's report has been published as
Charles W. Ehrhardt et al., The Future of Capital Punishment in Florida:Analysis
and Recommendations, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 2 (1973). Two members of the
committee have written a short article describing the legislative debate over reinstatement of the death penalty in Florida. See Charles W. Ehrhardt & L. Harold Levinson,
Florida'sLegislative Response to Furman: An Exercise in Futility?, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1973).
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an impassioned statement in opposition to reinstatement of the death
penalty, asserting that capital punishment,
degrades us all and runs counter to values I have believed in and
sought to uphold over my lifetime. In future years, I believe people
will look back on the hangman's noose, the electric chair, and the
gas chamber, as we now view the barbarous instruments and trappings of torture utilized by our ancestors."1
After reviewing in detail the statistical evidence presented to the committee, Collins concluded that the use of capital punishment bore no
verifiable relationship to the rate of crime. He conceded that public
support for the death penalty was substantial, but argued that public
demand for executions "is due in large part to frustration over our failures in law enforcement and will go away in my judgment if our methods of dealing with criminals and potential criminals are made more
effective and certain. 62 Recalling his tenure as governor, Collins stated
that "I signed death warrants of twenty-nine men in my six years as
governor. And I can still almost call each name, it caused such a traumatic experience for me." 63
Chairman Drew, also opposing reinstatement, asserted that "I am
as firmly convinced, as I am sitting here at this table, that this country
has witnessed its last execution.""' He found it "inconceivable," he explained, that the United States Supreme Court "could one day turn
loose 600 people who had the shadow of death hanging over them, and
in a short time turn around and say it's okay to execute others. ' 65 Despite his fervent opposition to reinstatement of the death penalty, Drew
argued that Furman had been wrongly decided, characterizing it as "a
flagrant usurpation of the power of the legislative branch of government."'6 In opposing reinstatement of the death penalty, he identified a
diverse range of concerns: his belief that, "statistically, there is no evidence that its imposition contributes to the prevention of murder or
other crimes;" the fact that "once such sentence is carried out, there is
no way to effectively correct an error;" his perception that "intermina61.

Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 126.

62. Id. at 129.
63. Askew Study Group Backs Death Penalty, TAMPA
at IA, 20A.

TRIBUNE,

64.

ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,

65.
66.

Id.
Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 122.
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ble delays in the disposition of capital cases in the courts creates disrespect for all criminal laws;" and, perhaps most important, his conviction that reinstatement would be pointless given the likelihood that any
new statute would be struck down by the United States Supreme
Court.6 7 Drew retained that conviction throughout the debate; after a
statute was ultimately passed, he labeled it an "exercise in futility." 8
In the end, the margin of support for reinstatement of the death
penalty came from the state legislators on the committee, who voted 41 in favor. 69 That result seems unsurprising since advocates and oppo-

nents of capital punishment agreed that public support for the death
penalty was overwhelming. One committee member, Representative

Eugene Brown (D-Tavares), stated that an informal poll of his constituents showed 1100 in favor of the death penalty and fifty-two opposed. 70 Representative Brown noted that "[there's a message there, at

least to one who's seeking public office. ''71

After the vote of the Governor's Committee, passage of a new
death penalty statute appeared almost certain. There remained consid-

erable controversy, however, concerning the form that such a statute
should take. Attorney General Shevin, interpreting Furman to require
the elimination of jury discretion in capital sentencing, had recommended that death be mandatory upon conviction for specified crimes.
The House and Senate committees had agreed, though they had broadened the range of crimes for which death would be mandated. The

67.

Id. at 123.

68. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 3, 1972, at I IA.

69. Voting in favor were Sens. Jim Williams (D-Ocala) and Louis de la Parte
(D-Tampa), and Reps. Robert Johnson (R-Sarasota) and Eugene Brown (D-Tavares).
Representative Cherry was the only legislator on the Governor's Committee who voted
against reinstatement. Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 142.
In the view of Hugh McMillan, Jr., Askew's assistant for legislative affairs, the
most significant aspect of the Committee's vote was that "neither de la Parte nor Williams wanted to follow the senior statesmen [Collins and Drew] . .

.

.At that point

they were both highly ethical, highly effective members of the state Senate." Interview
with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21, 1990). Their support for
capital punishment was significant both because of Askew's respect for their views and
because it suggested that any effort to block reinstatement would meet with opposition
from Senate leaders.
70. Harold Stahmer, another member of the committee, recalls that Representative Brown "wheeled in on a dolly a pile of letters" as a visible symbol of his constituents' support for the death penalty. Interview with Harold Stahmer in Gainesville, Fla.
(Dec. 12, 1990).
71. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 22, 1972, at 9B.
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Governor's Committee, by contrast, preferred a statute similar to the
one passed the previous March, which required a bifurcated trial and
consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The staff
report of the committee argued that a mandatory sentencing law would
not eliminate the potential for arbitrariness identified in Furman:
The jury's discretion to convict or not convict a defendant of a capital felony remains intact in the guilt or innocence phase of the
trial. It is entirely conceivable that the jury will continue to send
minority defendants to the electric chair by convicting them of the
capital offense and that the more affluent majority will be spared
by an arbitrary jury finding of guilt of a lesser-included offense, not
72
capital.
The bill ultimately recommended by the Governor's Committee was
drafted by a subcommittee headed by Representative Robert Johnson
(R-Sarasota). 7 ' That bill was modeled after the March statute but differed from it in two significant respects. First, the sentencing determination was to be based exclusively upon the statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, and the finding of at least one aggravating
factor was a prerequisite to a sentence of death. Second, the choice
between imprisonment and death was to be made not by a jury, but by
a special panel made up of the judge who had presided at trial and two
other circuit judges assigned by the Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court. The three-judge sentencing scheme, inspired by European
trial procedure,7 ' was defended as a means of reducing the likelihood of
arbitrariness by utilizing sentencers who would be free from the passions of the local community in which the crime had occurred. 75
Surprisingly little attention was paid to the possibility that the bill
passed the previous March (with an effective date of October 1) itself
72. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 21, 1972, at lB.
73. Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 146.
74. Defending the bill on the House floor, Johnson stated that "I got this frankly
out of reading extensively on capital punishment and found that it's being used in
France, West Germany, Scandinavia, and most of South America." Tape of Florida
House of Representatives Floor Debate (Nov. 29, 1972) (on file at Florida State
Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
75. On the House floor, Representative Johnson noted that the two additional
judges would be appointed from outside the circuit where the crime occurred "because
they don't stand election in that circuit. They don't have to face the emotional trauma
of the people of that circuit every day, and they would be totally objective and unbiased in their decision." Id.
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imposed sufficient constraints on the jury's discretion to meet constitutional requirements. 6 A special committee of the Florida Bar took the

position that the March statute was constitutional, 7 as did Senator
David McClain (R-St. Petersburg), the sponsor of the bill.78 The legal
advisory staff to the Governor's Committee disagreed, arguing that,
the statute apparently contains constitutional infirmities, since it
does not require a finding of the presence of an aggravating circumstance prior to the imposition of the death penalty but rather
allows the jury the same discretion in determining when the death
penalty should be imposed that was condemned in Furman.7 9

The Attorney General's office, of course, had condemned the bill on the
ground that any non-mandatory sentencing scheme would be constitutionally deficient. The Florida Supreme Court's enigmatic decision in
State v. Whalen, 0 rendered on November 22, 1972, appeared to fore-

76. Robert Johnson recalls that "[tihe feeling was that that bill ... was a bandaid type approach" that would not survive judicial scrutiny. Interview with Robert
Johnson in Sarasota, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990).
77. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 20, 1972, at 6B.
78. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 24, 1972, at 12B.
79. Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 146.
80. 269 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1972). Whalen involved a defendant who pleaded guilty
to first degree murder shortly after the decision in Furman. The trial judge certified to
the Florida Supreme Court the following question: "Does a trial court sitting as the
sole trier of fact after accepting a plea of guilty to first degree murder and holding an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of the extent of the penalty, have the power to impose

the death sentence?" Id. at 679. Apparently the judge sought to invoke the provisions
of the bifurcated trial law. The Florida Supreme Court, relying on Donaldson v. Sack,
265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972), held that "[tihis question concerning bifurcated trials is
moot since at the present time capital punishment may not be imposed. This Court has
held that there are currently no capital offenses in the State of Florida. If there is no
capital offense, there can be no capital penalty." Whalen, 269 So. 2d at 679.
That is odd reasoning. In stating that there were no capital offenses in Florida, the
Donaldson court meant simply that on the date of its decision (July 17, 1972), Florida
had no constitutionally adequate procedure for capital sentencing. If the bifurcated
trial law passed in March was sufficient to comply with Furman, then when the new
law became effective on October 1, capital offenses would once again have existed. It
therefore made no sense to say that the absence of capital offenses rendered moot the
issue of the new law's constitutionality. The effect of Whalen was to remove all doubt
that a new statute was required, while giving no indication as to the Florida Supreme
Court's views on the constitutionality of non-mandatory capital sentencing.
Of course, even if the bifurcated trial law was constitutional, its retroactive application to a crime committed before its effective date might have been problematic,
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close the possibility that the March statute could be constitutionally
applied.
On November 20, Governor Askew broke his silence, announcing
that he would recommend passage of a bill to restore capital punishment. 1 Two days later, in a twelve-page letter to the legislature,
Askew placed his support behind the bill drafted by the Governor's
Committee, calling it "the only proposal which, in my judgment, can
pass constitutional muster."8 2 Askew noted that "[i]n essence, this procedure is a modification of the state's 'bifurcated trial' law, which I
recommended and the Legislature adopted at the last Regular Session,
except that the list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is
made 'obligatory rather than advisory,' in order to limit discretion." '
On November 27 the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty held its first meeting of the new legislative session. Chairman Gautier began by admonishing the witnesses to concern themselves only
with the "technical aspects" of the various bills before the committee,
and not to speak to the desirability of capital punishment.8 4 A series of
witnesses spoke in favor of the Governor's Committee bill, arguing primarily that it had the greatest chance of withstanding the scrutiny of
the United States Supreme Court. Assistant Attorneys General George
Georgieff and Ray Marky, arguing in favor of a mandatory sentencing
law, were outspoken in their condemnation of the bifurcated sentencing
scheme. Georgieff, reading Furman to require that the legislature
rather than individual sentencers must decide precisely which crimes
merit a sentence of death, stated:
I put it to you very plainly: if you put in any system that vests
discretion in the people as to whether this individual should live or
die and takes it out of your hands, which is what they condemned
in Furman, I promise you that the result has to be the same, they'll
strike it down. When you decide that an individual must die if he

particularly if the sentencing was artificially delayed in order that the new law might
be applied. But see Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 297-98 (1977). The Whalen
court, however, did not suggest that its holding was influenced by retroactivity
concerns.
81. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 21, 1972, at lB.
82. Letter from Reubin Askew to Senate President Mallory Horne, and House
Speaker Terrell Sessums 3 (Nov. 22, 1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives,
Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757, Box 11).
83. Id.
84. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Nov. 27, 1972).
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then that is all that's

necessary. 5
Marky attacked the concept of a discretionary sentencing scheme,
and also ridiculed the particular aggravating and mitigating factors
used in the Governor's bill: "These standards are so nebulous, so vague
• . . that I can fit them in every death case that I've ever handled
. . . . The standards are ludicrous. They're vague, they're ambiguous,
and they exist both pro and con in every death case . . . .That's the
height of arbitrariness."8 6 Indeed, Marky, who had previously stated
that the Askew bill "absolutely defies" the ruling in Furman, suggested
that the bill might be a ploy to scuttle capital punishment entirely:
"Some people may be trying to pass a bill that is patently unconstitutional. Opponents of a bill have done that before, you know." 87 Ultimately the vote was 6-5 to report to the floor the mandatory sentencing
bill drafted by the House Select Committee.
On November 28, the governor addressed the legislature at the
special session. Governor Askew called for passage of a death penalty
statute, 8 though he acknowledged that "I continue to have mixed feelings as to the necessity, the rightness, and even the legality of capital
punishment in any form." 89 Askew again stressed his support for the
bill recommended by his committee, arguing that a mandatory sentencing law was unsound as a matter of policy and unlikely to gain the
approval of the United States Supreme Court:
I'm convinced that a law providing for mandatory imposition of the
death penalty, with no opportunities for mercy, would merely
prompt juries to convict on lesser charges. And the discrimination
to which the court so clearly objected would still be present. It
merely would take place sooner . ..in the conviction itself. The
same groups discriminated against in the past would draw convictions of premeditated murder-and therefore die; while others
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Jere Moore, Jr., Rift Develops over Capital Punishment, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 27, 1972, at 15.
88. Although the special session was initially scheduled for the purpose of debating a capital punishment bill, the session was not limited to that issue. The Governor's
Proclamation convening the session also requested action on eight other topics, including ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (on which the legislature ultimately
declined to act). Fla. J. Senate I (Nov. 28, 1972).
89. Id. at 7.
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would be convicted of lesser crimes, and therefore live. I think it's
obvious the court would reject such a system and therefore render
your efforts counter-productive. 0
In arguing that the United States Supreme Court would strike down a
mandatory sentencing statute, Askew emphasized the Furman dissenters' disapproval of such laws 9 1-a tack also taken by his supporters in
the legislature. Askew's speech was interpreted by many as a threat to
veto any mandatory sentencing bill passed by the legislature-an impli9 2
cation that the governor would neither confirm nor deny.
The debate over mandatory versus discretionary capital sentencing
revealed a tension between the goals of consistency and individualized
consideration that subsequent jurisprudence has not successfully resolved. On the one hand, fairness seems to require that all capital defendants (at least within a given state) should be judged by uniform
criteria rather than by the idiosyncrasies of a randomly selected jury,
and that race in particular should play no part in the sentencing decision. On the other hand, it may cogently be argued that no person
should be put to death without an individualized assessment of his
crime and of any evidence that he may proffer in mitigation.9 3 Advocates of the mandatory approach essentially argued that the values of
consistency and individualized treatment were irreconcilably in conflict
and that, of the two, consistency was more important.
Proponents of the bifurcated trial approach believed that the two
values could be accommodated. By drafting precise sentencing standards, the legislature could provide for an individualized assessment in

90. Id. at 7-8.
91. Askew noted that "Chief Justice Burger, who dissented from the court's recent decision regarding capital punishment, nevertheless condemned the mandatory approach as archaic. And the other members of the court who also dissented from the
majority, concurred with the Chief Justice on that point." Id. at 8.
92. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 29, 1972, at lB.
93. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), where the
Court opined that an individualized sentencing determination is required in order to
treat each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of
the individual and, in addition, because,
a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the
risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may
call for a less severe penalty.
Id. at 605.
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every capital case while ensuring that all capital defendants would be
judged by the same criteria." To put it another way, the advocates of
this approach argued that a system of "guided discretion" could strike
a balance between the extremes of mandatory sentencing and standardless jury discretion that would be preferable to either. 95
94. The drafting of such statutes was not an enterprise that the Supreme Court
had encouraged. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the Court had suggested that the effort was doomed to failure:
Those who have come to grips with the hard task of actually attempting to
draft means of channeling capital sentencing discretion have confirmed the
lesson taught by history . .

.

.To identify before the fact those character-

istics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be
fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be
tasks which are beyond present human ability.
Id. at 204. Indeed, the McGautha Court cited the Model Penal Code's capital sentencing statute-which has served as the model for most post-Furman laws-as an example
of the futility of such an exercise. See id. at 207 ("It is apparent that such criteria do
not purport to provide more than the most minimal control over the sentencing authority's exercise of discretion.").
95. The Supreme Court's capital sentencing jurisprudence has proceeded along
two largely independent tracks. Decisions involving constitutional limitations on the
states' freedom to define aggravating factors have stressed the Furman principle that
the sentencer may not be given unfettered discretion, See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988) ("Since Furman, our cases have insisted that the channeling
and limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action."). In discussing the states' obligation to permit consideration of
mitigating factors, however, the Court has stressed the need for an individualized sentencing determination. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) ("By
holding that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant
mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency."). The uneasy coexistence between
these two lines of authority has in turn spawned a vigorous counterattack, articulated
most recently, and at greatest length, in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Walton
v. Arizona, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3058 (1990).
Justice Scalia appears to overstate his case when he refers to "[t]he simultaneous
pursuit of contradictory objectives," Id. at 3064, and argues that the Court's invalidation of mandatory capital sentencing in Woodson v. North Carolina was "rationally
irreconcilable with Furman." Id. at 3067. There is nothing incoherent or self-contradictory about the view that some medium between mandatory sentencing and unconstrained discretion is preferable to either extreme. Justice Scalia appears correct, however, in arguing that the individual sentencer's absolute discretion to decide what
factors are and are not mitigating cannot be squared with Furman. The quest for consistency requires that the legislature place some limitations on the factors which the
judge or jury may consider in making its sentencing determination; the evil of unguided
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The mandatory statute reported by the committee initially attracted "seventy or eighty co-sponsors" in the House 9 6 In the end,
however, supporters of the Governor's bill prevailed. The mandatory
sentencing bill approved by the House committee was reported to the
House floor on November 29. Representative Gautier, arguing in favor
of the bill, circulated a memorandum from Attorney General Shevin.
That memorandum stated that the Askew bill "flies into the teeth of
' and that "it conthat which was condemned in Furman v. Georgia"97

tinues to be my view that the more nearly legislation approaches the
status of mandatorily imposing death, the more likely the chance of

surviving [Supreme Court] scrutiny." 98
Representative Johnson offered the Askew bill as an amendment.
In contending that the Supreme Court would strike down a mandatory
sentencing scheme, Johnson placed heavy emphasis on Chief Justice
Burger's condemnation of a mandatory death penalty. The four
Furman dissenters99 would vote against such a statute, he argued, as
discretion, after all, was that different sentencers might have widely varying notions as
to the concerns that are relevant to the decision between life and death. The fact that
this arbitrariness might be thought to work in favor of the defendant (by expanding the
range of factors that might cause a jury not to impose a capital sentence) does not
make the system consistent with Furman. The sentencing schemes condemned in
Furman were struck down, it should be recalled, partly because of the infrequency with
which capital sentences were imposed. The central premise underlying the opinions of
Justices Stewart and White in Furman was that an otherwise lawful sentence of death
could be rendered unconstitutional if other, similarly-situated defendants were spared
due to the idiosyncrasies of local juries.
96. Robert Johnson asserts that Democrats "wanted their name on a bill-they
wanted their name on a program, there's no question about that. They didn't want a
bill passed that was under a Republican banner or Republican sponsorship." Interview
with Robert Johnson in Sarasota, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990). In light of Askew's support for
the bifurcated trial approach, it seems more accurate to describe that bill as a bipartisan, rather than a Republican, measure. Johnson is surely correct, however, in suggesting that the mandatory sentencing bill was strictly a Democratic product. Democrat Robert Shevin had first advanced the idea of mandatory sentencing; the bill itself
was drafted by the House Select Committee, composed entirely of Democrats, that met
during the fall of 1972.
97. Memorandum from Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General 2 (Nov. 27, 1972)
(copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 19, Carton 464).
98. Id. at 4.
99. Representative Johnson's conclusion that all four Furman dissenters would
oppose a mandatory sentencing scheme was presumably based on the fact that Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist had joined Chief Justice Burger's dissent. Although
Justice Blackmun's dissent (with which no other Justice joined) expressed abhorrence
for mandatory death penalties, the dissents of Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no
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would Justices Brennan and Marshall: "Now that's four men who say
they will not accept mandatory death, and you have two more that say
they will not accept anything. And that's six to three, no matter how
you cut the pie." 100 Johnson also noted that sentencing is traditionally
performed by judges and asserted that,
[wle [on the Governor's Committee] read Furman v. Georgia to
say that juries cannot play a part in sentencing . . . . We believed
that if you have a bifurcated trial with a jury you still have the
same subjection to arbitrary, capricious, and discriminating judgment in sentencing, and it would not be upheld. So we said, can we
use one judge? And we felt that the Supreme Court would say one
judge alone would have the same possibility of whimsical, freakish
application .

.

. .1o-

Johnson concluded that "I really feel that what we have done is credible and it has the best chance of any to be upheld under Furman v.
Georgia. I do know that mandatory death has none." 1021
The motion to amend passed by a vote of 70-47. Despite Governor
Askew's emphatic support for the nonmandatory bill, Democrats voted
38-36 against the amendment; Republicans, perhaps swayed by Johnson's presentation, supported the Governor's position 34-9.101 Propo-

nents of the Governor's bill, moreover, were far more successful in rallying support outside the legislature than were advocates of mandatory
sentencing. A long list of witnesses appeared in support of the Askew
bill at the House Select Committee hearing on November 27; only
Marky and Georgieff testified in favor of the mandatory bill. The pubposition on the issue.
100. Tape of Florida House of Representatives Floor Debate (Nov. 29, 1972) (on
file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 30, 1972, at 5B. Johnson's persuasiveness was
due in part to his evident familiarity with the issue:
I personally had read everything there was at that time, the most recent
studies on capital punishment . . . . I wrote about a sixty page document
on capital punishment out of all the reports that I had read and out of the
studies of the commission and I gave it to every member of the body, and
when I stood and debated for several hours I think they believed that I
.. . had some idea what I was talking about.
Interview with Robert Johnson in Sarasota, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990). A copy of Johnson's
paper is on file at the Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757, Box II.
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lic defenders from all twenty Florida judicial circuits expressed a preference for the Governor's bill, 10' as did a statement issued on behalf of
the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 10
The question of which bill to pass was the only subject of contention on the House floor. After the successful motion to substitute the

Askew bill for the measure approved by the Committee, the bill was
approved by the astounding margin of 119-0. Representative Cherry,
an adamant opponent of capital punishment in previous years, explained her vote on the ground that the Governor's Committee bill was
"the best we can come up with" and maintained that sentiment within
the legislature was "just like a steamroller . . . .Everybody wants to
kill somebody . . . . They think they must do this in order to go
home." 06

Within the Senate there was general agreement with the use of an
aggravation-mitigation hearing as opposed to a mandatory sentencing
scheme.""7 The Senate, however, was unreceptive to the proposal for
three-judge sentencing. Opposition to that feature of the Askew bill
was based on several grounds: the state's tradition of jury sentencing in

104. The public defenders recommended that capital punishment not be reinstated but expressed support for the Askew bill in the event that a law was passed.
(Telefax on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757, Box 11).
105. On behalf of the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association, James T. Russell, President, stated that,
the Association believes that the bifurcated trial approach as set forth in
the Governor's proposal has the best chance to be sustained in the United
States Supreme Court and is the most realistic and practical procedure for
eliminating the evils condemned by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Furman decision.
Statement on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757, Box 11.
Representative Johnson argued on the House floor that "when you can come up
with a bill that the state attorneys say is just, and fair, and reasonable in every manner,
and the defenders say the same thing about [it], then I think that we have done a very
credible job." Tape of Florida House of Representatives Floor Debate (Nov. 29, 1972)
(on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
106. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 30, 1972, at 5B.
107. Senators Dempsey Barron (D-Panama City), Louis de la Parte (D-Tampa),
and Jim Williams (D-Ocala) were particularly influential within the Senate on this
point. Interview with Jack Gordon in Miami Beach, Fla. (Dec. 20, 1990); Interview
with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21, 1990); Interview with
Edgar Dunn in Daytona Beach, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990); Interview with Richard Pettigrew
in Miami, Fla. (Dec. 19, 1990). Senators de la Parte and Williams had served on the
Governor's Committee.
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capital cases; 0 8 the fact that the two additional judges would be assigned only after a conviction and thus would not have heard the evi-

dence at trial;' 09 the fear that three-judge sentencing would impose a
strain on judicial resources;" 0 and the possibility that the assignment
of circuit judges would be subject to manipulation by the Chief Justice

of the Florida Supreme Court."' The Senate bill placed the initial sentencing recommendation in the hands of the trial jury. If the jury recommended life, that recommendation was binding on the judge; but if
the jury recommended death the judge could nevertheless sentence the

defendant to life. The bill passed by a vote of 39-1. The lone opponent
was freshman Senator Jack Gordon (D-Miami). 12 Gordon acknowledged that the bill had "refined" prior law but argued: "However re-

fined a process, it is still a barbaric process. Refined barbarism is no
way to preserve a social order that values the sanctity of human
108.
109.

FLORIDA TIMES-UNION,

Dec. 1, 1972, at 14A.
A Fair System to Punish Murderers, TAMPA

110.

William Cotterell, Gov. Askew Not Likely to Get What He Wants, TALLA-

TRIBUNE, Dec. 2, 1972, at

14A.
HASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 28, 1972, at 13.

111. Senator Dempsey Barron (D-Panama City) argued: "Suppose the chief justice was against capital punishment? His choice of the judges would be influenced by
his own feelings. Or he might be a hanging chief justice which would be unfair to the
defendant." FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Dec. 1, 1972, at I IA.
Robert Johnson recalls that "Dempsey Barron took the lead on the Senate side.
He was adamantly against the three-judge [panel] . . . .[Barron] was a very strong
defense lawyer and believed very strongly in the jury system" Interview with Robert
Johnson in Sarasota, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990).
112. Gordon explains that,
I had no intention of speaking on anything certainly the day I was sworn
in. I figured I'd be patient until ... April . . . .On the other hand, I also
expected that there'd be some opposition. I figured that it would probably
pass, but there'd maybe be ten, twelve votes against it, primarily on religious grounds . . . .So when the debate started, I just sort of waited for
somebody else to say something, and nobody did.
Interview with Jack Gordon in Miami Beach, Fla. (Dec. 20, 1990).
Gordon's opposition to capital punishment was based on his religious convictions
rather than on civil liberties concerns:
From a Jewish theological perspective, [capital punishment] is not something you should be for . . . .Even though there's an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth in the Bible, the history of Jewish jurisprudence,
Talmudically, is that if the court sentences .. .someone to death more
frequently than every sixty or seventy years, then they're supposed to get a
new court.

Published by NSUWorks, 1992

27

Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 10

1326

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 16

life."' 18
The conference committee met on November 30 until well after
midnight and then reconvened before 8:00 A.M. 1 4 The committee appeared ready to accept a compromise offered by Representative William Rish (D-Port St. Joe) under which each defendant would be given
the choice between jury sentencing, three-judge sentencing, or sentencing by the trial court alone.1 15 Edgar Dunn, Askew's general counsel,
indicated that this arrangement was unacceptable to the Governor, and
negotiations continued. Ultimately, the committee agreed upon a system whereby the jury would recommend a sentence of either death or
life imprisonment and the trial judge, based upon his assessment of
aggravating and mitigating factors, would make the final decision. The
system approved by the conference committee thus permitted a single
individual to sentence a defendant to death-a result that both the
House and Senate sentencing schemes were designed to avoid.
The ultimate impact of Florida's "jury override" provision has
proved anomalous. The initial decision to involve the trial judge in the
sentencing process was intended as a protection for the defendant and
was based on the belief that judges would be less prone to an emotional
response than would a jury. The bill that emerged from the conference
committee, however, permitted the judge to impose a capital sentence
despite the jury's recommendation of mercy. That change stemmed
from the conferees' belief that an "asymmetrical" sentencing scheme
would be invalid under Furman."'
In practice, however, the jury override provision has furnished
minimal protection to defendants. In only a small number of cases
since the statute's enactment have trial judges overridden jury recommendations of death. Life recommendations, by contrast, have quite
frequently been overridden. 1' 7 As United States Supreme Court Justice

113. ST, PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 1, 1972, at IA.
114. For a very interesting article describing the frenzied nature of the conference committee's work, see ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 3, 1972, at 12B.
115. John Van Gieson, House Approves Death Penalty, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Dec. 1, 1972, at 1.
116. Interview with Edgar Dunn in Daytona Beach, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990);
Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of Imposing
Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31, 70 (1985).
117. As of 1985, trial judges had overridden jury recommendations of life on 84
occasions. Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1409, 1413 (1985). Precise figures on overrides
of death recommendations are unavailable. Professor Radelet states, however, that
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John Paul Stevens has noted, "a procedure that was probably intended
by the legislature to provide the defendant with two chances to obtain
mercy seems actually to have provided the prosecutor with two oppor' Efforts to amend or repeal the
tunities to obtain the death penalty."118

jury override provision have been rebuffed by the legislature, largely

out of fear that any change in the statute will furnish new grounds for
appeal for defendants previously sentenced. 119

The bill as amended by the conference committee placed the final
sentencing decision in the hands of the trial judge but did not indicate
what deference, if any, was owed to the jury's recommendation.12 Similar uncertainty characterized the statutory provision governing the
Florida Supreme Court's review. The statute provided that "[t]he judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic
review by the Supreme Court of Florida . . . . Such review by the Supreme Court shall have priority over all other cases and shall be heard
in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court."1 2 ' The
statute does not otherwise define the scope of the appellate court's re-

view-whether it is limited to claims of legal error, for example, or
whether it includes de novo reconsideration of the propriety of the capital sentence. Prior Florida law provided no guidance, since under the
old death penalty statute, the Florida Supreme Court could not over12
turn a sentence of death unless it reversed the underlying conviction.

"[n]umerous inquiries to several criminal attorneys and state officials ... make us
confident that less than a dozen such cases have occurred [as of 1985] since the current
statute was enacted." Id.
118. John Paul Stevens, Legal Questions in Perspective, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 4 (1985).
119. Interview with Edgar Dunn in Daytona Beach, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990); Mello
& Robson, supra note 119, at 68, 71; interview with Robert Johnson in Sarasota, Fla.
(Dec. 18, 1990). Johnson states:
I am not willing to vote to change one comma on the Florida capital punishment act. Period. If you change one comma, you open up every avenue
of appeal that ever existed all over again .

. .

. They said it's constitu-

tional, and until they change their minds, we're not going to change the
law.
Id.

120. The bill stated only that "[n]otwithstanding the recommendation of the
jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall
enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death." 1973 Fla. Laws 724 § 9, codified at
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1972).
121. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1972).
122. Ehrhardt & Levinson, supra note 60, at 11.
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' 128
The statute thus established a "trifurcated sentencing procedure
which divided power among judge, jury, and appellate court, but the
law gave no indication as to the proper allocation of responsibility
among the three sentencing authorities.""
The Florida legislature was anxious to adjourn, and debate on the

123. Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533, 542 (Fla. 1975) (England, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).

124. The Florida Supreme Court's efforts to resolve these issues have not been
entirely successful. Early on, the court held that "[a] jury recommendation under our
trifurcated death penalty statute should be given great weight. In order to sustain a
sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person
could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). The Florida Supreme
Court's application of the Tedder standard has been erratic, however. See Grossman v.
State, 525 So. 2d 833, 851 (Fla. 1988) (Shaw, J., concurring) ("During 1984-85, we
affirmed on direct appeal trial judge overrides in eleven of fifteen cases, seventy-three
percent. By contrast, during 1986 and 1987, we have affirmed overrides in only two of
eleven cases, less than twenty percent.").
Similar inconsistency has characterized the Florida Supreme Court's discussions of
its own authority; compare Songer v. State, 322 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1975), where the
court stated: "When the death penalty is imposed, this Court has a separate responsibility to determine independently whether the imposition of the ultimate penalty is
warranted" with Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1981) where the
court stated:
Florida's death penalty statute

. . .

directs that a jury and judge, not this

Court, must weigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances delineated in the statute to determine whether death is an appropriate sentence . .

.

.This Court's role after a death sentence has been

imposed is "review," a process qualitatively different from sentence "imposition." It consists of two discrete functions. First, we determine if the jury
and judge acted with procedural rectitude . .

.

.After we have concluded

that the judge and jury have acted with procedural regularity, we compare
the case under review with all past capital cases to determine whether or
not the punishment is too great . .

.

.Neither of our sentence review func-

tions, it will be noted, involves weighing or reevaluating the evidence adduced to establish aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Our sole concern on evidentiary matters is to determine whether there was sufficient
competent evidence in the record from which the judge and jury could
properly find the presence of appropriate aggravating or mitigating circumstances. If the findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
are so supported, if the jury's recommendation was not unreasonably rejected, and if the death sentence is not disproportionate to others properly
sustainable under the statute, the trial court's sentence must be sustained
even though, had we been triers and weighers of fact, we might have
reached a different result in an independent evaluation.
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amended bill was minimal. The vote was 116-2 in the House and 39-1
in the Senate.12 8 Governor Askew signed the bill a week later, describing it as a "good product of the legislative process;" 2' the Governor
had previously explained that "I still prefer a panel of three judges, but
I'm primarily concerned with the fact that the death sentence shouldn't
be mandatory. 11 7 One legislator referred to the bill as "a model piece
of legislation that all the other states will look at with a great deal of
envy." 1' 8 Editorial reaction was generally favorable. The Tampa Tribune stated:
Justices of the Supreme Court in their readiness to bend the Constitution to fit their own sentiments may find the new Florida law
as invalid as the old. But, if so, some of the responsibility for future
callous killings of innocent citizens will rest with the Court, not
with Governor Askew and the Legislature. They have fashioned a
fair method for punishing the guilty and deterring the potential
killer.""
The Florida Times-Union took the view that the death penalty is "in
the opinion of many, including us, a deterrent to heinous crime. It is a
protective device sorely needed by a society which has been stripped of
many of its former protections against rampant crime."' 3 0 Only the St.
Petersburg Times dissented:
Askew . . . should, but probably won't, veto the compromise death
penalty bill which fails to fully conform to standards he proposed.
If Florida must bear the stigma of being the first state to try to
restore capital punishment, it should be with a system less barbaric
than the Legislature's final product."3 '
125. Representative Cherry and Representative Eugene Tubbs (R-Merritt Island) voted against the bill in the House, though two days earlier they had supported
the bill which provided for three-judge sentencing. Senator Gordon again cast the lone
negative vote in the Senate.
126. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 7, 1972, at 4B.
127. Death Penalty Hits a Snag in Senate, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 30,
1972, at 14.
128. John Van Gieson, Legislature Approves Death Sentence Bill, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, Dec. 2, 1972, at 14 (quoting Representative George Williamson (R-Fort

Lauderdale)).
129.

A Fair System to Punish Murderers, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Dec. 2, 1972, at

130.
131.

FLORIDA TIMES-UNIoN, Nov.
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec.

14A.
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Significant misgivings remained, however, even among supporters
of capital punishment. Several legislators expressed dissatisfaction that
so important an issue had been debated and resolved in the frenzied
setting of a special session. Senate President Mallory Horne (D-Tallahassee), for example, stated: "We all got caught up in the commitment
to have a session. None of it really passed muster on the question of
absolute emergency. I think we handled too much too fast." '32 Senator
Louis de la Parte (D-Tampa) asserted: "If we're going to decide
whether to have something as important as the death penalty in Florida, I don't think we should have to do it on a rush-rush-rush basis." 13
Governor Askew defended his decision to schedule a special session on
the ground that "[h]ad I not indicated last summer that I would call a
special session in the fall, the chances would have been better than average that the Legislature, in the middle of the campaign, might have
called themselves back into session. This is better." 3 4 Also, many of
the bill's proponents expressed serious doubts as to the prospects for a
favorable decision in the United States Supreme Court. Senator Dempsey Barron (D-Panama City) stated that "it's very unlikely any bill we
pass will have a great deal of influence on the Supreme Court." 35 Senator Jim Williams (D-Ocala), a supporter of the death penalty on the
Governor's Committee and in the legislature, asserted that "[tihe next
person executed will be in another generation, not ours. It's over. It's
over."

'1 3 6

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Public Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment

No referendum was taken in Florida on the issue of capital punishment in 1972. No statewide polls were published. And, because legislative candidates were virtually unanimous in their support for the
death penalty, the results of the November elections provide few clues
as to popular sentiment on the issue. The available evidence indicates,

132. Bill Purvis, Legislature Passes Death Penalty Bill, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Dec. 2,
1972, at 12A.
133. Tom Raum, De La Parte Criticizes Special Session, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 29, 1972, at 24.
134. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 21, 1972, at lB.
135. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 3, 1972, at IlA.
136. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 2, 1972, at IA.
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however, that a sizeable majority of the Florida electorate supported
the enactment of a new capital sentencing bill. A poll of Pinellas
County residents showed seventy-three percent in favor of reinstatement.137 Letters to the editors of Florida newspapers ran heavily in
favor of capital punishment.13 8 The dearth of candidates who expressed
opposition to the death penalty is itself an indication-albeit an indirect one--of the strength of popular feeling.
Perhaps the most compelling indication of the strength of public
support for capital punishment in the fall of 1972 may be found in the
arguments of those who opposed the death penalty. Those who argued
against passage of a new capital sentencing statute did not claim to
represent. the views of a majority of Floridians. Instead, they expressly
acknowledged their minority status and urged legislators to resist the
pressures of public opinion. LeRoy Collins, for example, stated that "I
know most people in the state want the death penalty, but I dissent."' 139
Miami attorney Tobias Simon, testifying before a legislative committee, referred to Florida abolitionists as "the silent minority."' 4 Virgil
Mayo, president of the Florida Public Defenders Association, told the
House Select Committee that he opposed capital punishment but acknowledged that "I say in all fairness if I sat in your position I'd vote
for capital punishment . . . because I think that [representing the
views of one's constituents] is the duty of the elected representative."'"'
In part, the public's attitude reflected tradition. Participants in the
1972 debates suggest various explanations for the state's history of support for the death penalty. James Apthorp, Governor Askew's chief of
staff in 1972, states:
I think that the more rural parts of our state are no different from
other parts of the South, and they generally support capital punish137.

ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,

Nov. 23, 1972, at lB.

138. A St. Petersburg Times' request for letters pro and con elicited 461 letters
in favor of reinstatement and 142 against. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 30, 1972, at
23A. That result is especially striking in light of the Times's fervent opposition to capital punishment and its status as Florida's leading liberal newspaper.
The most poignant expression of support for capital punishment that my research
has revealed is a letter to the editor from "A.C." which concludes: "If some one [sic]
were to murder me, my last wish would be that the one that did it hangs. And with my
last breath I would condemn the Supreme Court." A.C., Letters, TAMPA TRIBUNE,
Dec. 6, 1972, at 23A.
139. Reaction Favors Decision, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Dec. 2, 1972, at 14.
140. House Hearings-transcript, supra note 46, at 21 (Aug. 9, 1972).
141. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Oct. 27, 1972).
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retirement areas of our state, where we have
tend to support capital punishment; it's the
and people who are frightened at times about
. . . . Maybe the combination of those two
.

Richard Pettigrew notes that "Florida's always been

. . .

a state that's

almost like a frontier state, in that there's a huge movement of new
people in all the time,"1 " and argues that the influx of new residents
creates a sense of instability and a consequent desire for strong measures to combat crime. Jack Gordon perceives a connection to the reli-

gious makeup of the state, arguing that support for capital punishment
is rooted in the belief "that people ought to be punished for their
sins-a very Calvinistic way of looking at the world. 144 Whatever its
roots, in 1972 that tradition was well-established; at the time that

Furman was decided, Florida's death row was by far the nation's
largest. 1 5

Other factors were significant as well. Sharply rising crime rates
during the years prior to Furman created the impression of a society

that was careening out of control.140 Controversy over busing during
142. Interview with James Apthorp in Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1991).
143. Interview with Richard Pettigrew in Miami, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990).
144. Interview with Jack Gordon in Miami Beach, Fla. (Dec. 20, 1990). Participants on both sides of the debate frequently invoked religious principles in justification
of their positions. However, Harold Stahmer, a professor of religion who served on the
Governor's Committee, states that the connection between religious affiliation and attitudes towards the death penalty turned out to be less predictable than he had
anticipated:
Collins and I sat next to each other, and he's a pillar of his Episcopal
church. We started-we'd get a list of people who had asked to appear
before us. And there'd be a clergyman, and initially if they came from
what I would call established denominations-Lutherans, Methodists,
Presbyterians-I would assume they'd be opposed to the reinstatement of
the death penalty. Didn't work that way. [Collins] and I sort of gave up
guessing .

. .

. Sometimes the Baptists, the Fundamentalists who normally

come on hard for retribution, they were kind of split. Some of them were
high on retribution, and reinstatement, and others were opposed to it.
Interview with Harold Stahmer in Gainesville, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990).
145. Florida had 99 inmates on death row; Ohio was second with 55. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 30, 1972, at 8A.
146. As LeRoy Collins pointed out, however, the incidence of non-capital crimes
in Florida rose far more dramatically during the 1960s than did the rate of capital
crimes. See Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 127, 130.
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the spring of 1972, and the disastrous performance of George McGovern's presidential campaign,1 4 stirred distrust of "liberalism" in any
form. Lingering public resentment at the campus and urban unrest of
the previous decade, coupled, perhaps, with disgruntlement over the
Warren Court's innovations in the field of criminal procedure, increased the electorate's impatience with those who appeared overly
concerned with protecting the rights of society's "deviant" members
and insufficiently committed to the maintenance of public order.""8 Any

attempt to assess the relative importance of these various factors can
only be a matter of speculation. It seems safe to say, however, both
that elimination of capital punishment in Florida would have been a
very difficult task in any year, and that 1972 was an extraordinarily
unpropitious time to make the attempt.
Among proponents of the death penalty, there was no consensus as
to the primary justification for capital punishment. Some advocates relied on retributionist arguments;"4 9 many expressed distrust of the
state's parole commission and argued that murderers sentenced to life
imprisonment would be released to kill again.150 Supporters of the
death penalty relied most heavily on the argument that the threat of
capital punishment would deter potential murderers. These proponents
rarely contended that the death penalty's deterrent effect could be
demonstrated by statistical evidence.' 5 ' They relied instead on anecdo147.

In 1972, Richard Nixon carried 72 percent of the Florida vote. ST. PETERS-

BURG TIMES, Nov. 12, 1972, at 17A.

148. Retired Circuit Judge Ernest Mason, a member of the Governor's Committee, stated: "I am of the opinion that of late too much emphasis has been placed upon
the so-called humanitarian rights of the criminal at the expense of the victims of homicides or their relatives." Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 125.
149. Stella Thayer, a Tampa lawyer who served on the Governor's Committee,
recalls that Dr. Vernon Fox of Florida State University "was quite persuasive as a
proponent. He had a concept of social aggression, and that if a society didn't ensure
swift, prompt, and honest justice, then he felt that that deterioration continued down
through all of society." Interview with Stella Thayer, in Tampa, Fla. (Dec. 17, 1990).
15(0. For example, a statement issued by the Florida State Chamber of Commerce's Board of Directors argued that "a life sentence does not mean a life sentence,
as all convicted persons are entitled to be considered for parole after six months in
Florida." (copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 19, Carton
464).
151. Indeed, proponents of capital punishment generally conceded that the empirical evidence failed to establish a deterrent effect. Robert Johnson states that the
empirical evidence presented to the Governor's Committee "certainly raised various
questions, the questions were debated very heavily. . . . But it certainly didn't sway
the commission, obviously." Interview with Robert Johnson in Sarasota, Florida (Dec.
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tal evidence,152 or on the intuitive notion that an increase in the penalty
for a given activity would reduce the frequency with which that activity
occurred.
Due to the dearth of candidates who opposed reinstatement, news-

paper coverage of the 1972 legislative campaign includes little discussion of the death penalty, and the elections themselves provided little

opportunity to test the strength of public sentiment on the issue. It nevertheless appears to have been an article of faith among Florida
lawmakers that any elected official who opposed capital punishment
would risk political ruin. Mallory Horne, for example, recalls that,
I'd been Speaker of the House already, and had the pledges at the
time to be President of the Senate, and I knew going into that debate . . . that if I didn't assume a comfortable consensus position,
that I would give up the presidency of the Senate . . . . [I]t was
that volatile a political issue . . . . You could not say that you
were against the death penalty and survive politically. 15 3

18, 1990). Ernest Mason's response to the available statistical evidence was typical: "In
spite of all the so-called expert testimony that we have heard, I am of the opinion that
the death penalty is a deterrent to homicides and that it should be restored as such."
Governor's Committee Report, supra note 60, at 125.
152. Anecdotal evidence of very dubious reliability was frequently treated with
extraordinary seriousness. Senator Thomas, for example, read a statement provided by
Palm Beach County sheriff's deputies which quoted a recently-arrested murder suspect
as saying, "I should have killed two or three more people that I didn't like because
according to the new Supreme Court ruling I can only get life imprisonment no matter
how many I kill." ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 29, 1972, at lB. Shevin recounted the
tale of a New York bank robber who told his terrorized victims that "You have to have
the death penalty, otherwise this can happen every day." House Hearings-tape, supra
note 48 (Aug, 31, 1972). Representative Gautier stated that to him the most convincing evidence of the death penalty's deterrent value was the statement of one Florida
prison inmate that without capital punishment his mother would be unable to walk
safely to church on Sunday. Id.
153. Interview with Mallory Horne in Tallahassee, Fla. (Feb. 13, 1991).
Horne himself expresses substantial reservations about the wisdom of capital punishment-reservations based primarily on a general dissatisfaction with the criminal
justice system:
I worry not so much about the death penalty as I do it in conjunction with
the trial system itself. I worry about somebody being electrocuted that
wasn't really guilty .

. .

. [TIhere's just enough of a motivation on the

part of prosecutors to succeed that I've just seen so many shortcuts by
them-withholding evidence from the defendant, withholding knowledge
of big, major doubt, and going ahead with the case nonetheless because the
death itself was grisly. That's what worries me, and I can't separate that
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Hugh McMillan, Jr., Askew's legislative assistant during 1972, states
that "everybody was a little bit relieved that it was probably mainly a
technical, legal, constitutional issue and not a political issue, 'cause the
common wisdom was that on the political side, there's only one side;
there's no political future to being against it."'' 54
The fate of Senator Gordon-the only member of the 1972 Florida legislature who expressed an absolute opposition to the death penalty-is therefore illuminating. One might expect that the freshman
Senator, having characterized capital punishment as "refined barbarism" during his first week in office, would suffer the ire of both his
constituents and his colleagues. Gordon states, however, that his stance
has never hurt him electorally 55 and that it significantly enhanced his
stature within the legislative body:
[There were a] number of the north Florida legislators[] who were
sort of in control of the Senate at the time . . . [and upon whom]
it made a very positive impression . . . that somebody would be
willing to take the unpopular position and take the heat and not let
it bother him. So they came to rely on me and my word, and it was
a strange alliance; we're not sharing too much political philosophy,
'cause they're pretty conservative, but the way legislatures work,
being able to count on somebody when they tell you something is
exceptionally important . . . . I've twice been the Appropriations
[Committee] chairman . . . from a [Senate] President I didn't
support, because the north Florida gang wanted me there. . . . So
that's my estimate of what effect it had on.me politically. 56
The experience of a single official is admittedly a paltry basis upon
which to draw conclusions as to the political climate in 1972. Gordon's
experience at least suggests, however, that other assessments of the political costs of opposing the death penalty may have been overstated.

out from any punishment.
Id.
154.
1990).
155.

Interview with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21,
Although the issue has sometimes arisen in campaigns, Gordon states that

"I've generally answered it simply by saying it's just a matter of personal conscience."
Interview with Jack Gordon in Miami Beach, Fla. (Dec. 20, 1990).
156. Id.
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The Legislature and the Court

Commenting upon the bifurcated sentencing bill soon after its final
passage, Robert Shevin stated: "Since the Legislature passed what may
be a more socially acceptable bill, rather than constitutionally acceptable, it becomes our job to defend it and hope that I am wrong."'1 7 In
defending the statute before the Supreme Court, Shevin characterized
the legislature's actions in much the same way:
[W]hen I went to the legislative committees, the expression of the
legislative body was this: We would rather pass a good law, a fair
law that might be suspect, than to pass a mandatory death penalty,
even if it's allowed by Furman, because it is harsh. And that's the
kind of legislation the Florida legislature passed.I5s
There is a certain self-serving quality to these statements. Having lost
the argument over mandatory sentencing, Shevin sought to convince
the public that the legislature had not rejected his constitutional position at all, but had simply elevated policy over constitutional concerns.
Shevin's statements nevertheless raise extremely important issues. How
did the Florida legislature view its relationship to the United States
Supreme Court? How conscientiously did the legislature consider its
constitutional obligations? How ably did individual legislators, and
other participants in the legislative debate, articulate the constitutional
arguments on either side of the issue?
Participants in the committee debates did occasionally express the
view that the legislature should pass the bill it deemed superior as a
matter of policy rather than attempt to divine the preferences of the
157. FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Dec. 2, 1972, at Al. In light of the position taken
by Shevin (and his assistants Ray Marky and George Georgieff) during the 1972 debate, the state's brief in the United States Supreme Court is illuminating. The
brief-signed by Shevin, Marky, Georgieff, and one other attorney-was openly contemptuous of the petitioner's challenge: "[T]he positions advanced by Petitioner . . .
whether measured in Furman's scale or that of any other rational thought process are
lacking in any merit whatever . . . . Respondent is at a total loss as to just how the
Petitioner could conclude that the newly created Florida system violates Furman v.
Georgia." Brief for Respondent at 85-86, 94, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)
(No. 75-5706). It was of course entirely ethical for Shevin and his assistants to defend

the statute in the courts despite their misgivings as to its constitutional status; but the
contrast between their pre-and post-enactment rhetoric is surely striking.
158. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)
(No. 75-5706).
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United States Supreme Court. Representative Brown, for example, argued that,
no one has the ability to predict what the next decision of the
United States Supreme Court will be. So don't you believe that
we're better off doing what we think is right within that framework
rather than trying to make a decision based on what we don't know
they're going to do? "
As a characterization of the legislature's principal motivation, however,
Shevin's statements are simply insupportable. Presumably, the legislature did prefer a bifurcated sentencing bill to a mandatory statute as a
matter of policy-after all, a quite similar bill had been passed in
March, when constitutional concerns were not at issue. But advocates
of a nonmandatory bill also argued throughout the debate that such a
statute was more likely to withstand Supreme Court scrutiny than was
a mandatory sentencing scheme. Governor Askew emphasized this
point; witness after witness made the argument at the House Committee hearing on November 27, and Representative Johnson, leading the
fight on the floor, made this the focus of his attack.
The debate over which bill should be enacted was thus, to a very
large extent, a constitutional debate-a colloquy over the proper interpretation of the various opinions in Furman. That debate, it should also
be stated, generally proceeded at a high level. Few legislators spoke on
the floor, and there is no way of knowing how thoroughly the rank-andfile assimilated the arguments on either side. But the central arguments
were accurately identified and skillfully articulated by the leading participants-Governor Askew and Representative Johnson in the one
camp, Representative Gautier and the Attorney General's office on the
other.
Despite the high quality of the debate, the ultimate vindication of
the Florida statute was, in an important sense, fortuitous. Those who
predicted that the Court would sustain a bifurcated sentencing law, but
reject a mandatory statute, were proved correct: the Florida law was
upheld, while mandatory laws were struck down in Woodson v. North
Carolina"'° and Roberts v. Louisiana.16 ' But their heavy reliance on
the votes of the Furman dissenters proved to be unwarranted. Of the

159.

House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Aug. 31, 1972).

160.
161.

428 U.S. 280 (1976).
428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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four Justices who dissented in Furman, only Justice Powell subsequently voted to strike down mandatory sentencing laws. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, who in Furman expressed vehement disapproval of mandatory death penalty measures, voted to uphold the
statutes at issue in Woodson and Roberts.
It is of course quite common for Supreme Court Justices to argue
that a particular state policy should be upheld lest the government respond to its invalidation by adopting an even more retrograde approach.1"2 And the Justice who employs such an argument does not
thereby suggest that the feared alternative would be unconstitutional.
On this point Robert Marky was more prescient than his opponents:
while conceding that the dissenting Justices had expressed distaste for
a mandatory death penalty, he insisted that "I don't think Burger and
Blackmun will cross over the line of judicial restraint . . . .I mean,
that's the foundation of their judicial attitude."'16 3 Some state legislatures, it appears, adopted mandatory sentencing schemes in the mistaken belief that such action was required by the opinions of Justices
Stewart and White. Florida lawmakers avoided that fate, at least in
part, because of their misreading of two dissents.
In deciding which death penalty bill to support, I have argued that
Florida legislators were heavily if not primarily influenced by constitutional concerns. Constitutional scruples appeared notably absent, however, when legislators decided whether to vote for any capital sentencing bill at all. Forty-seven members of the House, for example, voted
against the proposal to substitute the Askew bill for the mandatory sentencing bill reported by the House Committee. Many of these legislators presumably acted in the belief that Furman required mandatory
sentencing-indeed, that was the only argument advanced in favor of
the mandatory approach. Yet all forty-seven voted "yea" on the next
vote, when the choice was between a bifurcated sentencing scheme and
no death penalty bill. Nor is there any evidence that these legislators
perceived themselves (or were perceived by the public) to be on the
horns of an ethical dilemma. The record suggests that the Florida legislature was acutely aware of the limitations placed upon it by the
United States Supreme Court, but that legislators saw their relation-

162. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13
(1979) ("if parole determinations are encumbered by [judicially mandated] procedures
that states regard as burdensome and unwarranted, they may abandon or curtail
parole").
163. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Nov. 27, 1972).
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ship to the Court as one of power rather than of duty. These
lawmakers were serious and conscientious in their efforts to understand
the Supreme Court's instructions because they recognized that without
Supreme Court approval no executions could take place. But they acknowledged no obligation to support only those measures which they
believed would satisfy the standards announced by the Court.1'6 Freshman Senator Bruce Smathers (D-Jacksonville) no doubt spoke for
many legislators when he inserted into the Senate Journal the following
explanation for his vote:
I am voting yea because of the necessity to reinstate capital punishment in Florida. I have many reservations as to the constitutionality as well as the content of many sections. However, the special
session did not allow the necessary time for open hearings, nor
careful consideration that a bill of this magnitude deserves. Rather
than have no bill at all-I support this compromise.6

164. A single legislator did state that, despite his support for the death penalty,
constitutional scruples prevented him from supporting the bill drafted by the conference committee. Representative F. Eugene Tubbs (R-Merritt Island) inserted into the
House Journal the following explanation for his vote:
I voted negative on the Capital Punishment Conference Committee report
for the following reasons:
1. I do not feel that this legislation overcomes the objections
raised by the nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.

2. In the unlikely event that the U.S. Supreme Court finds
this legislation constitutional, I have serious doubts that the
death penalty will be utilized by the courts of Florida.
As I favor the death penalty and as I favor the three judge tribunal concept for sentencing, I cannot in good conscience vote for this bill.
Fla. J. House Rep., Dec. 1, 1972, at 51.
165. Fla. Sen. J. 40 (Dec. 1, 1972).
The argument here is that many legislators voted in favor of the Florida death
penalty bill despite their serious doubts as to its constitutionality. One scholar has advanced the more disturbing suggestion that some state legislatures may have enacted
death penalty statutes in the wake of Furman because they believed that the Supreme
Court would strike them down:

Rather than inhibiting legislative action, the constitutional rhetoric had
created an atmosphere in which legislators could have it both ways. They

could satisfy some constituents by voting for capital punishment and yet
explain their votes, to themselves and to their anti-death law constituents,
on the plausible grounds that the law would never be applied.
GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 27 (1982). At least in
Florida, the evidence does not support this theory. All the evidence indicates that a
very large majority of the legislature supported capital punishment, believed that their
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Two eminent students of the death penalty have recently argued
that the explosion of post-Furman capital sentencing statutes was primarily the product of resentment at the United States Supreme Court's
intrusion into an area traditionally reserved to the states. Noting that
the great majority of post-Furman executions have occurred in southern states, these scholars contend that,
[r]ather than a resurgent national perception of capital punishment
as the solution to the criminal homicide, what this pattern illustrates is a state response to a federal slight that was seen as arbitrary and unwarranted. There is, after all, a long history of disagreement with, and of political and legislative challenge to, the
Supreme Court's antimajoritarian rulings.1"6
At least as to Florida, the evidence does not support this view. The
meticulous efforts to decipher the various opinions in Furman, and
thereby to divine the Supreme Court's instructions, bespeak an attitude
very different from defiance. Some proponents of capital punishment
did accuse the Supreme Court of overreaching, but no one appears to
have urged that the desire to assert state autonomy furnished a sufficient reason for passage of a new statute. Representative Johnson, for
example, argued that,
Furman v. Georgia was a very harsh case, in my opinion, and one
which should never have been rendered. It was a great injustice to
our nation . . . . But we can't argue with that now. I would say
this to you, that whether or not Furman v. Georgia was ever decided, we should be here today anyway, deciding whether or not we
can come up with a better system of justice for the state of
167
Florida.

constituents supported it, and would have voted for a death penalty bill even if they
had known that it would lead to executions. Moreover, the lengthy and often acrimonious debate over which sentencing statute should be enacted would have been altogether
pointless if legislators had in fact assumed that no bill would survive judicial review. It
is surely possible that some lawmakers who might otherwise have opposed the bill declined to do so in the belief that the courts would intervene, but there is no reason to
suppose that these members formed a sizeable percentage of the legislature.
166.

FRANKLIN ZIMRING

AMERICAN AGENDA

&

GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE

44 (1986).

167. Tape of Florida House of Representatives Floor Debate (Nov. 29, 1972) (on
file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
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Many of the leading participants in the debate, moreover, did not
quarrel with Furman at all, but expressly acknowledged the capriciousness of pre-Furman capital sentencing in Florida. When Governor
Askew finally recommended passage of a new death penalty statute, he
deplored the,
unbridled use of discretion in the sentencing process by which we
have applied capital punishment, which has resulted in discrimination. This I found to be particularly true in Florida at the time the
Furman decision was handed down, where out of twenty-six (26)
inmates on death row for rape, nineteen (19) were black. I find it
of paramount importance, therefore, both from a legal and moral
standpoint, to recommend legislation to you which substantially
improves the process.10 8
Ray Marky, testifying before a legislative committee, stated:
We must discern the difference between the jury reaching a competing conclusion of fact predicated upon reasonably accurate instructions from a jury whim because there was no instructions for
them to follow whatever, which is what you had in Furman. See, in
Furman, the judge just says, "It's up to you." . . . [W]e just said
(to the jurors], "Here, go and have your fun, decide what you want
to do with this human." So there was no real frustration of the
legislative determination. 1"
Indeed, one of the most emphatic (and persuasive) denunciations of
pre-Furman capital sentencing is set forth in Florida's brief to the
United States Supreme Court in Proftt v. Florida:
It is not surprising that sentences determined under the "system"
condemned by Furman produced uninformed, irrational, and
freakish results . . . . The legal "system," was not a "system" at
all! It had none of the attributes of a "system" designed to achieve
any degree of uniformity. Indeed, the "system" was such that the
ultimate question was presented to twelve citizens without any
guidance whatsoever who were told that they and they alone could
determine the question within their unbridled and unfettered dis168. Letter from Reubin Askew to Senate President Mallory Horne and House
Speaker Terrell Sessums 2 (Nov. 22, 1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives,
Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757, Box 11).
169. House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Aug. 31, 1972).
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cretion. Such a method is about as rational as submitting the issue
of the defendant's guilt to a jury without instructing them as to
applicable law and letting them wonder in utter speculation as to
whether the accused committed any "crime." Such was the system
which was finally found wanting by this Court because it conferred
upon juries and/or judges the power to indiscriminately sentence a
person to death and actual experience has demonstrated contradictory sentences were returned in cases involving similar crimes.170

At least in Florida, support for a new capital sentencing statute in the
fall of 1972 cannot persuasively be portrayed as a means of defying the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman.

C. Furman as a Remand to the Legislature
Public officials at the time Furman was decided, and commentators then and since, have deplored the ambiguity of the Court's decision.1" 1 That ambiguity-which stemmed both from the opaque quality
of the individual opinions and from the fact that each Justice in the
majority wrote separately-unquestionably had significant costs. In
Florida, for example, the legislature enacted the jury override provision
in the mistaken belief that such action was required by Furman. If the
Court's goal was to force legislatures to adopt new and more reliable
170. Brief for Respondent at 89-91, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (No.
75-5706). Tactical considerations might of course have induced the state's attorneys to
refrain from a challenge to Furman when they defended the new statute before the
United States Supreme Court. The state's brief, however, did not simply assume or
even concede the correctness of Furman: it articulated the strongest possible argument

in favor of that decision. Moreover, the state set forth the same argument in its brief to
the Florida Supreme Court-a tribunal that would hardly have been flattered by references to the inequities of pre-Furmancapital sentencing. See Brief for State of Florida
at 14-15, State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (No. 43,521).
171. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Constitution and the
Death Penalty, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1758 (1987) ("Furman so starkly deviated

from the traditional format that it can be characterized as a decision in which there
was not only no Court opinion but no Court-only a confederation of individual, even
separately sovereign, Justices."); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT.
REV. 305, 315 (Furman "is not so much a case as a badly orchestrated opera, with nine
characters taking turns to offer their own arias."); Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of
Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 40 ("[T]he way that
the Furman majority presented itself to the world-five separate opinions with none
commanding the concurrence of any Justice other than its author-seemed almost deliberately calculated to make this judgment of dubious value as a precedent.").
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capital sentencing schemes, the argument goes, why did the Court not
clearly state what procedures would survive constitutional scrutiny? It
may be, however, that Furman is best understood not as a failure to
provide guidance, but as an effort to provoke debate. More precisely,
Furman may be read as holding that death penalty statutes then in
place were void on the ground of desuetude.
Alexander Bickel recognized that some rarely-enforced statutes
may remain on the books even though they no longer embody the public will-partly because it is always more difficult politically to repeal a
statute than to prevent its enactment, and partly because non-enforcement (or selective enforcement) may itself reduce the likelihood of a
public outcry for repeal. "When [such a statute] is resurrected and enforced," Bickel recognized, "it represents the ad hoc decision of the
prosecutor, unrelated to anything that may realistically be taken as
present legislative policy. ' ' l 7a The opinions of Justices Stewart and
White-which argued that the infrequency with which capital punishment was imposed had transformed the death penalty from an instrument of policy to one of caprice-sounded a similar theme. These Justices employed the Eighth Amendment ban on "unusual" punishments
as a textual basis for striking down the Texas and Georgia laws on a
ground that was functionally indistinguishable from reliance on
desuetude. 17
By invalidating an infrequently used statute on the ground of desuetude, Bickel argued, the Court can shift to the statute's proponents
the burden of demonstrating that contemporaneous public and legislative support for the law still exists, while leaving open the possibility of
re-enactment if such support can be gathered. 17 ' In a somewhat similar
vein Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Furman, acknowledged that he
was,
not altogether displeased that legislative bodies have been given the
opportunity, and indeed the unavoidable responsibility, to make a
thorough re-evaluation of the entire subject of capital punishment
. . . .The legislatures can and should make an assessment of the
deterrent influence of capital punishment, both generally and as af172. Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40,
61-64 (1961).
173. At least one scholar has previously noted a possible connection between the
Court's decision in Furman and the jurisprudential theories of Bickel. See GUIDO CALABRESI,

A

174.

COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES

26 (1982).

Id. at 63.
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fecting the commission of specific crimes.' 7 8
It is at least plausible to suppose that some members of the Furman
majority were influenced to vote as they did not simply by their perception that capital sentencing procedures were deficient, but by their desire to ensure that capital punishment would continue only if contemporaneous public support for the death penalty was sufficient to achieve
the passage of new statutes.
It is clear, moreover, that when the Court revisited the issue in
1976, it assumed that a wide-ranging public debate over capital punishment had occurred in the four years since Furman. The opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Gregg v. Georgia1 6 stated:
The petitioners in the capital cases before the Court today renew
the "standards of decency" argument, but developments during the
four years since Furman have undercut substantially the assumptions upon which their argument rested. Despite the continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century, over the morality and utility
of capital punishment, it is now evident that a large proportion of
American society continues to regard it as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction. The most marked indication of society's
endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman. The legislatures of at least 35 States have enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty ....7
In a companion case, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, also relied on the legislative
activity as dispositive evidence "that capital punishment is acceptable
to the contemporary community as just punishment for at least some
intentional killings.' 178 Each of the thirty-five states listed, however,
had a death penalty statute on the books in 1972 when Furman was

175. Furman, 408 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
176. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
177. Id. at 179-80.
178. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 353 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
Ray Marky had anticipated the possibility that the legislative reaction to Furman
might influence the Supreme Court's conclusions as to the propriety of capital punishment. Testifying before the House Select Committee in 1972, Marky stated that "the
contemporary notions [of decency] predicted by the Supreme Court in June of '72 after
a lot of referendums and a lot of committees meet may be different." House Hearings-tape, supra note 48 (Nov. 27, 1972).
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decided.1 79 The legislative activity cited by these seven Justices can be
regarded as "new evidence" only if we assume that the recent passage
of a statute is a more accurate indicator of public sentiment than is the
failure to repeal a law enacted in the distant past. That assumption
seems reasonable enough; but it surely reflects Bickelian ideas of legislative inertia rather than the Supreme Court's ordinary view that statutes of whatever vintage are presumed to embody the majority will.
The Gregg plurality's reliance on recent legislative developments
reflects another unspoken premise as well: that the process of enacting
new capital sentencing procedures will in some way involve a debate as
to the propriety of capital punishment vel non. That this premise is not
necessarily accurate may be seen by considering the United States Su80 In Spaziano, the
preme Court's decision in Spaziano v. Florida.1
Court upheld Florida's jury override provision, which allows the trial
judge to sentence a defendant to death despite the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment. Suppose, however, that Spaziano had prevailed. Many Florida inmates would have been removed from death
row, of course, but it hardly seems likely that a broad debate over the
propriety of capital punishment would have ensued. The legislature
would simply have repealed, quickly and with little discussion, the jury
override provision. Much the same result could have been expected, it
seems to me, if the Furman Court had clearly announced that the arbitrariness of prior capital sentencing could be prevented by the adoption
of the standards articulated in the Model Penal Code. 8' It was the
very ambiguity of the Furman decision which, by creating the sense
that nothing could be taken for granted and that every aspect of the
problem must therefore be explored, increased the likelihood of a debate which would include the wisdom of the death penalty itself.
For present purposes, my concern is not with whether the Furman
Court actually sought to produce the "thorough re-evaluation of the
entire subject of capital punishment" forecast by the Chief Justice, nor
with whether the effort to produce such a re-evaluation would be an

179. Compare Gregg 428 U.S. at 179-80 n.23 (opinion of Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, JJ.) with Furman, 408 U.S. at 340 n.79 (Marshall, J., concurring).
180. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
181. Indeed, the Florida legislature's actions during the spring of 1972 should
dispel the notion that revision of capital sentencing procedures is necessarily accompanied by a re-examination of the propriety of capital punishment. In March 1972, the
state enacted its bifurcated trial law, yet the legislature rebuffed Governor Askew's
request for the establishment of a commission to study the death penalty.
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appropriate use of federal judicial power.18 2 I am concerned instead
with whether such a re-evaluation did in fact take place in Florida.
Insofar as the legislature is concerned, the record is mixed. Certainly
no meaningful deliberations occurred at the special session itself: Representative Gautier, in fact, began the November 27 meeting of the
House Select Committee by admonishing the witnesses that their comments should be limited to the "technical aspects" of the various bills
under consideration and that discussion of the propriety of capital punishment would be inappropriate. On the eve of the legislative session,
passage of some death penalty bill was universally presumed to be inevitable, and controversy centered entirely on the nature of the statute to
be drafted. Indeed, the sense of inevitability was so great as to induce
"lesser-of-evils" reasoning even among those not ordinarily inclined towards moral relativism. Florida's Catholic bishops asserted:
It is certainly our hope that the time is not far distant when capital
punishment will be abolished altogether. Many men of goodwill
nevertheless remain since convinced that the death penalty serves
as a strong deterrent of the more heinous crimes. For this reason
alone it would be unrealistic to assume that capital punishment will
not be restored on a very limited basis in Florida. 83
The statement then went on to stress the importance of safeguards to
prevent arbitrariness in capital sentencing.
To what extent did the legislative committees which met during
the summer and fall provide a substitute for plenary consideration of
the issue at the special session? The Senate Council on Criminal Justice, appointed by outgoing Senate President Jerry Thomas, drafted a
proposed statute which established a mandatory death penalty; but the
Council included only two Senators, held no hearings,18 4 and offered no

182. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 'Passive Virtues'-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).

183. Statement issued by the Catholic Bishops of Florida on Capital Punishment
(Nov. 29, 1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 757,
Box 11).
184. The Council explained that "[s]ince public hearings have been held by the
Governor's Committee to Study Capital Punishment and by the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty, it would be an unnecessary expenditure of public funds for

this Council to duplicate that procedure ....

" Letter from Senate Council on Crimi-

nal Justice to Senate President Mallory Horne 1 (Nov. 20, 1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 19, Carton 464).
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explanation for its conclusions.1 88 The House Committee conducted far
more extensive deliberations, but its attention was focused primarily on
the question of what sort of bill should be drafted. Nor did the House
Committee function effectively in its role as an assimilator of information and ideas on which other legislators could draw. Addressing the
committee soon after its formation, outgoing House Speaker Richard
Pettigrew cautioned the committee that much of the legislature in the
special session would be new and that the committee's report should
therefore be comprehensive.1 8 Pettigrew stated: "I think you should
have an in-depth majority and minority report or a series of minority
reports, if need be, so that every viewpoint is available to the Legislature as a whole, come November. ' 18 7 The committee's final report,
however, was only six pages long; the final four pages discussed the
debate between mandatory and nonmandatory sentencing, and the only
argument advanced in favor of enacting a new death penalty statute
was that "[i]n reviewing the testimony received, there was actually
very little opposition to the reenactment of capital punishment."1 8
To say all this is not to say that Furman accomplished nothing, or
that the legislative response to the decision was reflexive or uninformed.
The need to pass a law served to ensure that there existed a contemporaneous majority within the state favoring capital punishment; representatives were given ample time and opportunity to ascertain and act
upon the wishes of their constituents. That is hardly an insignificant
point: a principal aim of Bickelian jurisprudential techniques is to combat the inertial forces that often prevent the repeal of statutes that lack
contemporary support. Moreover, Furman at least helped to create a
climate in which abolition of the death penalty was deemed to be
among the options "on the table." This was due largely, I have argued,

185. The Council's final report included findings that "[t]he death penalty is a
deterrent to homicide, and there is a place in the field of law enforcement for capital
punishment; so the death penalty should be reinstated" and that "[tihe mandatory
death penalty is the proper method to follow in reinstatement." Id. at 3. The only
statement as to the basis for these conclusions was that "[t]he Council, in its deliberations, was able to draw upon the experiences of its members, the report of the Attorney
General, and the reports of the Governor's Committee to Study Capital Punishment
and the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty." Id. at 2-3.
186. House Hearings-transcript, supra note 46, at 3-4 (Aug. 9, 1972).
187. Id. at 6.
188. Final Report of the House Select Committee on the Death Penalty 2 (Nov.
27, 1972) (copy on file at Florida State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla., Series 19, Carton
464).
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to the ambiguity of the Furman opinions. Had the Supreme Court
clearly identified the sort of sentencing scheme that would withstand its
review, it is unlikely that the propriety of capital punishment would
have been considered a legitimate subject for debate.
Furman did not, however, at least in Florida, produce the "thorough re-evaluation" more optimistically forecast by the Chief Justice:
the legislature undertook no systematic study of the issue beyond its
effort to determine the will of the people. This is not to say that legislators acquiesced in a policy of which they did not approve. There is
every reason to believe that most lawmakers shared the public's view as
to the morality and the efficacy of capital punishment. The point is that
Furman did not induce either the public or the legislature to rid itself
of its preconceptions and start from scratch; society did not so much
"re-evaluate" the issue as simply "re-affirm" that it continued to adhere to its former view. Legislators did thoroughly and astutely debate
the issue of mandatory versus nonmandatory sentencing; but in other
respects the details of the statute ultimately passed did not reflect any
special expertise as to the mores and problems of Floridians. The aggravating and mitigating factors were taken directly from the Model
Penal Code; the jury override provision (the only feature of the statute
that is distinctive to Florida) was an accidental feature that no one
actually wanted and that has plainly failed to serve its intended
function.
D.

The Role of the Governor

Of all the participants in the Florida debate, the most enigmatic
was surely Governor Reubin Askew. Governor Askew was, for most of
the debate, a non-participant; he expressed no view on the issue until
November 20, a week before the special session convened. His ultimate
recommendation that a statute be enacted was accompanied by expressions of doubt as to the wisdom of his chosen course. Yet in the end,
Askew must be deemed the most influential actor of all, in the sense
that he, and he alone, might single-handedly have changed the outcome. Whether Askew's opposition could have prevented the enactment
of a new death penalty statute remains a matter of conjecture. 18 9 Un-

189. The question whether Askew's opposition could have prevented the enactment of a death penalty statute evoked widely varying reactions from those I interviewed. Mallory Horne states that "[ilf he had absolutely in the trenches opposed
it-in the first place I don't believe it would have passed, but if it had passed, his veto
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questionably, though, no other individual could have done so.
In the end, of course, Governor Askew recommended that a death
penalty statute be enacted. Harold Stahmer, a professor of religion at
the University of Florida who served on the Governor's Committee,
states: "I sized [Askew] up that he'd stick his neck out on race, on
integration, but he wasn't going to stick his neck out on the death penalty."19 Jack Gordon notes that "Askew, like most governors-they
don't like to be beaten. And so, they kind of use that veto pretty judiciously . . . . I don't think that Askew was overridden in eight years,
on anything-a product of very careful choosing." 191 Political considerations surely cannot be discounted. It seems clear that Askew would
have had nothing to gain and much to lose by opposing the reinstatement of capital punishment, particularly if his opposition had ultimately proved unsuccessful. But it is at least equally plausible that the
governor acted out of a sincere belief, after a period of exhaustive deliberation, that enactment of a new death penalty statute was in the
best interests of the state. Governor Askew, after all, did not have the
issue thrust upon him against his will; even prior to Furman, the governor had unsuccessfully urged the legislature to re-examine the propriety of capital punishment. Askew's aides (themselves adamant opponents of the death penalty) insist that political calculations played an
inconsequential role in his decision.1 92 Askew had shown himself willing
would have been sustained. He was a very popular governor at the time." Interview
with Mallory Horne in Tallahassee, Fla. (Feb. 13; 1991). Edgar Dunn expresses the
view that Askew could have sustained a veto if he had put his weight behind it. Interview with Edgar Dunn in Daytona Beach, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990). James Apthorp is more
doubtful: "I don't think he could have changed the majority opinion in the legislature.
It's possible he could have sustained a veto-maybe; that would have been hard, too.
There was very strong support-still is-in the Florida legislature." Interview with
James Apthorp in Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1991). Robert Johnson states unequivocally
that "I have no doubt that if [Askew] had come out against capital punishment, we
would have passed a bill and we would have overridden a veto." Interview with Robert
Johnson in Sarasota, Fla. (Dec. 18, 1990).
190. Interview with Harold Stahmer in Gainesville, Fla. (Dec. 12, 1990).
191. Interview with Jack Gordon in Miami Beach, Fla. (Dec. 20, 1990).
192. James Apthorp states:
I don't think he engaged in a lot of political considerations in thinking
about the issue. I mean, it was there, there was the specter of doing something unpopular, but that didn't bother him a lot on other issues. He was
• . .pretty courageous in taking public positions that didn't enjoy public
support . . . .He was never really afraid of public opinion as long as he
felt good about what he was doing.
Interview with James Apthorp in Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1991).
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to buck popular sentiment, particularly in the busing controversy that
erupted earlier that year.
Throughout his years as a legislator, Askew had consistently supported capital punishment. As Hugh McMillan, Jr. (Askew's legislative
assistant during 1972) explains, that position reflected the governor's
professional background and his instinctive reluctance to break sharply
from the past:
The governor as a young lawyer had been a prosecutor, and he's
basically a very compassionate person, but he comes out of a pretty
classically conservative value system. The few points where he really broke from that would be in his absolutely total commitment
to racial justice . . . .His background would be the background of
an essentially conservative person, which doesn't necessarily mean
you'd be for or against capital punishment, but he's basically not
looking for new ways to develop bold new approaches to things.'19
Though no one was executed during his two terms as governor, Askew's
perception of the unique responsibilities of his office appears to have led
him to re-evaluate his position. As one of his closest aides puts it,
"[ilt's a lot easier to favor capital punishment on some theoretical level
than it is to have to sign a death warrant."' 9 4 The same aide states that
Askew,
started out and wound up in the same position, but he really had a
struggle in between . . . .I think it was a real struggle between his
religious beliefs and his civic duty . . . .He sort of came from the
law enforcement, prosecutorial mindset at this issue. And he never
quite got beyond that, in my view, except that he was nagged, and

Hugh McMillan, Jr. agrees:
On an issue like this, he would be mostly trying to do what he thought was
the right thing to do; and by mostly I mean like about ninety-nine percent
. .. I compare him to Lincoln in some ways, in that he wasn't necessarily looking for trouble, he wasn't necessarily looking for a chance to be a
great leader, or a political hero, but he would absolutely not flinch from
doing what he thought was the right thing to do.
Interview with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21, 1990). Both
Apthorp and McMillan recall that they attempted to persuade Askew to oppose capital
punishment during the fall of 1972.
193. Interview with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21,
1990).
194. Interview with James Apthorp in Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1991).
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bothered, and almost brought down by his religious beliefs.195
McMillan notes that "[p]articularly any suggestions that there
was any racial bias or an economic class bias in the way it was either
applied or administered-Askew would have a sensitivity to those kinds
of concerns."'" 6 That assessment is borne out by the governor's emphatic denunciation of pre-Furman capital sentencing, in which Askew
focused on the disproportionate frequency with which blacks had been
sentenced to death. Askew may ultimately have become convinced--though not without lingering qualms 1 9'-that the sentencing
procedure devised by the Governor's Committee could alleviate the discriminatory aspects of the prior system, and that narrowly targeted use
of capital punishment could be an effective deterrent to violent crime.
In the end, the precise mix of factors that led to Askew's decision
must remain unknowable-even to the man himself. But if any true reevaluation of the issue took place in Florida during 1972, it took place
in the office of the governor. It was the Governor's Committee that
undertook the most thorough and systematic inquiry into the issue.
Only the Governor's Committee, for example, made any effort to grapple with the empirical evidence concerning the deterrent value of capital punishment. The governor himself, almost alone among Florida
public officials, appears to have made a genuine effort to set aside his
preconceptions and think through the problem anew.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Florida legislature's debate over the death penalty in 1972
furnishes a highly instructive example of the interaction between the
195. Id.
196. Interview with Hugh McMillan, Jr. in West Palm Beach, Fla. (Dec. 21,
1990).
197. James Apthorp indicates that Askew remained troubled by the issue
throughout his tenure as governor:
The things he did between 1972 and 1978, when he left-I mean it was six
years that ...

he could have been faced with this issue, but he avoided it

right down to the end. He stretched 'em out, he sent 'em back, he'd want
to know more about 'em; I mean, he'd ask for another report. He really
had a hard time facing this issue . .

.

. He spent the whole six years

struggling with it, and worrying about it, and trying to avoid having to do
it, and all the time he maintained this public position in favor of having
capital punishment, but it was really difficult for him.
Interview with James Apthorp in Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 15, 1991).
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United States Supreme Court and the elected representatives of the
people. The most obvious aspect of that interaction lay in the legislature's efforts to devise capital sentencing procedures that would withstand judicial scrutiny in the future. The debate within the legislature
furnished an odd species of constitutional discourse. The aim was not to
discover unifying principles shared by the Court generally. Rather, the
legislature's technique was to examine each of the Furman opinions
individually in order to determine each Justice's likely attitude towards
the bills under consideration, and the preferences of the Furman dissenters consequently assumed as much importance as did the views of
the majority. Given the disjointed nature of the Furman decision, however, no other method of constitutional inquiry would seem to have
been possible; and it should be said that leaders on both sides of the
debate were astute and careful in their parsing of the Supreme Court's
"instructions." At the same time, however, legislators acknowledged no
obligation to withhold their support from any bill that they believed
the Court would disapprove. Legislators sought to pass the bill that
enjoyed the greatest chance of Supreme Court approval; but virtually
all members of the body deemed it preferable to support a bill of
doubtful constitutionality rather than to support no bill at all.
The interaction between Court and legislature, however, went beyond lawmakers' efforts to devise capital sentencing procedures that
would satisfy the Court's concerns. The Supreme Court's decision in
Furman, I have argued, was not simply a command that new procedures be developed to determine which individuals would be condemned to die. The decision was, in addition, an invitation to renewed
debate on the question whether capital punishment should be employed
at all. An evaluation of the Florida legislature's performance during
the fall of 1972 must ultimately depend on one's conception of the
proper relationship between the people of a democracy and their
elected representatives.
One version of democratic theory holds that the elected representative should act solely as a proxy whose duty is to determine, and then
to advocate, the views of his constituents. Adherents of this position
could have no quarrel with the Florida legislature's disposition of the
death penalty issue. Insofar as the legislature's proper role is to give
effect to the values and preferences of its constituents, the decision to
reinstate the death penalty cannot be faulted. In concluding that capital punishment was not per se violative of the Eighth Amendment, the
Supreme Court in 1976 was heavily influenced by the spate of legislative activity that had occurred in the four years since Furman. Passage
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of new death penalty statutes, the Court concluded, was persuasive evidence that public support for capital punishment remained strong. At
least as to Florida, that inference appears justified. Capital punishment
was not foisted upon the public through parliamentary machinations. It
was not the brainchild of a single charismatic individual. It was not a
means of asserting state autonomy in defiance of the United States Supreme Court. The simplest explanation for the passage of the statute
appears also to be the correct one; capital punishment was reinstated in
Florida because a sizeable majority of the Florida public believed reinstatement to be a wise policy.
A second view of the legislative function emphasizes the need for
independence on the part of individual lawmakers. Although the legislator's duty is to seek the public good, the argument goes, the premise
of a representative democracy is that the people should elect officials
who possess a heightened understanding of political issues. The legislator's responsibility, on this view, is to act upon his own conception of
the common good. His decisions should be informed but not controlled
by the opinions of his constituents. Judged against this model also, the
performance of the Florida legislature in 1972 is difficult to criticize.
Had every legislator voted his conscience, there would presumably have
been more than one vote against the death penalty; but there is every
reason to believe that a sizeable majority of Florida lawmakers sincerely shared their constituents' support for capital punishment.
A third model of legislative action stresses the importance of the
lawmaking process. This view holds that legislatures can improve upon
the wishes of the electorate-not because individual lawmakers necessarily possess superior insights into public problems, but because the
fact-finding capabilities of the legislature, combined with the increased
understanding that emerges through collective deliberation and debate,
can enable the lawmaking body to develop solutions that no individual
member could achieve on his own. Those who believe that the legislature is obligated to engage in a process of deliberation that goes beyond
the ascertainment of public sentiment may be more troubled by the
performance of Florida's lawmakers. Individual legislators may have
thoroughly studied the issue of capital punishment; but the legislature,
as a collective body, engaged in no meaningful deliberation before voting in favor of reinstatement.
Even a theorist who generally adheres to this conception of the
legislative process, however, might be cautious about applying it to the
issue of capital punishment. Some aspects of the issue may be incapable of resolution by means of deliberation and debate. Whether retribu-
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tion is a legitimate function of the criminal justice system; whether it is
inherently wrong for the state to kill individuals in service of public
ends-these are questions which appear simply unsuited to rational argument. 198 To a significant extent capital punishment is one issue-abortion is another-on which the most committed members of
the opposing camps may share so few common premises as to make a
fruitful debate almost impossible. As to some of the moral issues implicated by the death penalty, it is doubtful that a legislative resolution
can ever be more than a poll.
The question whether capital punishment acts as a deterrent to
crime, however, would seem to be well-suited for elucidation through
the fact-finding mechanisms of the legislature. As to this aspect of the
problem, the Florida legislature's performance is more difficult to approve. Some individual legislators may have studied the available empirical evidence. But neither the House nor the Senate committee, nor
the legislature as a body, made even a cursory effort to accumulate or
consider the data bearing on this issue.
Models of legislative behavior tend to focus on individual issues
viewed in isolation. Implicitly they ask how an ideal legislature would
resolve a particular problem if it had no other business before it.
Viewed against this version of the deliberative process theory, the enactment of the Florida death penalty is easy to criticize. The deliberations conducted by the Florida legislature did not remotely resemble
the sort of inquiry one would expect from decisionmakers who deemed
the issue important and regarded the propriety of capital punishment
as a truly open question. At the same time, however, it seems unlikely
that any other measure which attracted the opposition of only one legislator would have been more thoroughly discussed. The cursory nature
of the legislative debate was to a large extent the result of the virtual
unanimity of the Florida legislature. Though prolonged deliberation
and debate might seem desirable as to any issue viewed in isolation, the
truth is that a productive legislature has neither the time nor the resources to give exhaustive consideration to more than a small number
of questions. These are almost certain to be issues which are perceived
as both significant and hotly contested. When legislators believe that
198. Jesse McCrary, Jr., a member of the Governor's Committee who opposed
reinstatement, asserts that "any time you start talking about capital punishment, if one
has dealt with it any at all, people have a mindset about it, and it's very difficult to
change people about that. It's a very emotional problem ......
Interview with Jesse
McCrary, Jr. in Miami, Fla. (Dec. 20, 1990).
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their intuitions about a public problem are universally shared, there is
little reason to move beyond intuition.
It seems likely that some "critical mass" of opposition to a state's
prevailing practice is necessary before the legislature can realistically
be expected to undertake a true re-evaluation of the issue. The aftermath of Furman in Florida thus demonstrates both the potential and
the limitations of Bickelian jurisprudential techniques. The Court's decision ensured that capital punishment would not remain in place unless contemporaneous public support could be demonstrated. It even
created an atmosphere in which opposition to reinstatement was regarded as an alternative that was legitimately on the table. The Court
could not, however, create a genuine clash of views where none had
previously existed; and without disagreement there is unlikely to be
debate.
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